THE FONCTION OF lfERft'H:HOEN lB SCHEIER'S TBEORY OF VA111E ABSTBACT hlcinda Aml Vandervort Brettler, THE FONCTION OF WERTFOm.mi Dl SCBEIER'S TBEORY OF VAUJE, Philosõ, M. A. Yertftlhlen, the faculty which theoreticall.y provides a cognitive grasp of objective value, is shawn to be of central importance to Scheler's value theory. The role of Vertftlhlen in Scheler's value theory is presented in detail. The history of affective perception &8 a cognitive principle 1s traced through the writingl!l of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl in order to establish the extent to which Scheler modif'ied the theory. The evaluation of Scheler' s notion of WertfBhlen focuses on three problee: the nature of value, the existence of Wertftlhlen, and error and illusion. Scheler' s po si tion is found to be unsatisfactory in certain. respects in relation to each of these problems and alternative positions are proposed. Scheler's account of self-givenness and his suggestions for the eljmination of illusory intui tions are found to be inadequate. *e o. THE !'ONC'l'IOI OF VBR'rJ.IIftaw Il SCBISlBR 'S mon OF VAUlB !JJ.ciDda ADn Vandervort Brettler SIlbmi tted to tbe Facu1 ty of Graduate Stadies aDd Research in partial fulfil.lJlent of the requirellents for tbe d.egree of Kaster of Arts !!cGill University lfarch, 1970 1 CV Lucinda Ann Vandervort Brett1er 1970-- ~ The folloving abb:rev1ations used in the footnotes of the text are grouped here for the convenience of the read.er. The full ti tles are also given in the first footnote referriDg to each work. Formalismus Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die OEteriale Wertethik7"ieuer Versüch .9!1: Grundl.eeung eines ethischen Personal1S1111S. ~ Psychologie .!e empirischen Standpunkt. Q 1S!. 0rig1n $:3 KIIo.ledge $: Right .!l!A Wrong. ]!!§! Jga Ursprung si ttllcher Erkermtnis. Ideas.ldeas: General Introduction.l9. ~ Phenomenologr. ~ Ideen .!!! ~ reinen PhIDomenologie oe. Ph!nomenologischen Philosophie. ~ Etbik - ~ Ethik ~ Erkermtnislehre. AU English translations in the text of the thes1s of quotations from ~ Fomalismus i!! i!!: ~ ~ ~ .;:118.::;:.te-.:,rl.:;;:a1=e Wertethik and froll PaycholoBie :!.2!! empirischen Standpupkt are mine, as there 1s DO pIlbl1shed English translation of the former and no Engl1sh translation of the latter vas readily available ta me. In aU cases vhere l have translated a passage, the original. Ge1'Dl8ll 18 provided in a footnote. !he German bas also been given vhen.ever a tem 18 used vhich bas a particular sigo1f1cance not easily rendered in Engl1sh or vhere confusion migbt occar due ta the techn1ca1 or systematic use of a terme 11 'Vertftlhl.en' 1s a term. of central importance for the problems discussed in tbis thesis aDd consequently bas been introduced vith particul.ar care on pages 2 and ,. 'Brfolpethik' (see page 5) 1s also a difficu1t term. as 1t bas no exact English equival.ent. l have chosen to render it as "an etbic based on the outcome of action" tbough this 1s not necessarily the only possible translation. 1 Gesinmmgl (see page 5) 1s not precisely "state of mind" or *state of spirit", but somevhere between the two, aDd in addition involves the notion of the "predisposition" or "disposition" of the agent~ AU references in the text of the thesis in the fom (p. 190) refer to the FormaliSlllllS. l vish to tbaDk Professor Baymond nibansky for bis patient guidance. l also wish to thank Henrietta S. Schoonover for the assistance she bas given me vith problems of translation. iii CBAPmR OB: IBTRODUC'l'ORY!EMARKS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 1 CBAPmR NO: AF!ECTIVE PERCEFTIOIl AS A COGNITIVE PBI!lCIPOE III S DITIllGS OP FBAIZ :BBEIiTABO ABD ED!DBD HUSSERL • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . CHAPE mEE: ~.AND ITS RaIE III SCHEOElt'S VAUJESORY. • • • • ClUPm FOUR: EVALUA'l"ION OF SCBEJBR'S DOCTRIIE OF lIBRTFfbnD. • • • • 1. The Nature of Value 2. The Brlstence of VertttDù.en 3. The Problems of Error and Illusion CHAPrER FIVE: COIlCIDSIOIl. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .APPDDIX: CODEllTS REGARDIIlG MATERTATS AVAILABOE III EBGLISR Oll SCBELRR'S EoeBICS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 20 57 88 91 BIBI.IOGRAm' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• ~ iv One of the fundamental questions in ethical theory 1s that of how ethical disagreements arise and how they may be resolved. The age-old problems of wbat the good 1s, and how men dec1de what the good 1s, lie immediately at the base of such questions. It 1s in our interest in these two problems that we find common ground vi th Hax Scheler; for these problems are the central issues vi th which ~ Formalismu.s ~ ~ Bthik: ~ .4!!. materiale Vertethik 1 1s concerned. Moreover, insofar as va are interested in the possib111ty of a universa! science of value, va will cons1der Scheler's notions of value and va1ue-f~l1ng (Verttflhlen) wi th particular care. This 1s espec1all.y true in an era when there are few who find 1t possible to oppose ethical relativisme The notion of a universal science of value suggests two questions in particu.lar. The firet is whether there are universal value categories and the second is whether, once given these universal value categories, there is a uni versa! omer by which these categories are ranked in importance. Ve will return to the firet question in our evaluation of Scheler's notion of Vertf'fthlen and his concept of value and to the seco!ld 1J!ax Scheler, Der Fonlalismu.s in der Bthik und die aateriale Wertetb1k: Neuer Versuch ~ GruD'dl.esung einesetÏiischen PersoniliS1lll1S, ed. Maria Schèler, 4th ed., in Gesammelte Werka. (Berne: ~), II (1954) Hereafter aU notes in the teTt ~n t~e form (p.~ refer to this edition, hereafter ci ted as Formalismu.s. 1 2 in connection with Scheler's hierarchy of values. Both questions relate to the ep1steJDological basis of value discussion and disagreement. If i t vere possible ta find common ground. hare, communication betveen disagreeing parties would become possible even in the face of contin,,; ng disagreement as ta the particular object each party valued througb the same feeling of value. The second question 1s concerned wi th the measïll'8 in which there csn be a universal order of the realm of value as grasped by human beings and how abstra.ct this order necessarily would be. The problem of error 1s of tondamenta! s1gDificsnce for both of these questions and indeed for any attempt ta discover what the good 1s and hov men dec1de what the good is. Our analysis of Scheler's doctrine of Vert-tfthlen will therefore be focused on the question of vhethar, and to vbat degree, Wertf'fthlen solves the problell of error in value knovledge. Ve bave chosen ta translate the German adjective material, vhich signifies tbat which pertains to content rather than ta form, as 'non-for1D8l' rather than e.a 'material' in order ta avo1d confusion vith the German adjective materiell which signifies 'material' in the sense of non-spiri tnal, corporeal, occupying space. The main problem with such a cho1ce is tbat the term tlms translated gives a ~re negative sense to Scheler's response to ethical formalism than does the German term. Vertft!hlen is the other term for wbich a teclm:ical explanation must be given at this point though i t 1s assumed. tbat a grasp of the .!!Y! signi.ficance of the term will be gained only througb exhibition of its use in Scheler's system. Vertft!hlen 1s quite litera.l.ly 'feeling of value'. FrJh1en is used "Dy Scheler to d.esignate affective perception wbich DIIlBt be strongly differentiated :t'roll both Einsicht. which ha.s the sigDificance of intuitive insight of an axiological essence or essential arlological correlation, and Gef'flhl, which is a feeling-state or affective state. Affective perception is by definition intentional, tbat is, it is a consclous act (not astate, not passive) oriented towards an objecte ilertf'6h1en, s.a a type of affective perception, bas in common vith the other kinds of Ff!hlen the characteristic of intentionality. ilerttfthlen, however, has, in addition to this characteristic of intentionali ty, a cognitive function, ~ F8h1en ~ Ge:f'6h1en, or Ff!hlen ~ gegenst8ndli chen emotionalen Stimmunga-Charakteren (p. Z71, n. 1). ~ YertfUhlen alone among the various forma of lmù.en should have a cognitive :f'unction ls vortby of further examination, but the fact that Scheler maloea such. a bold claim ls set forth by ws:y of preliminary explanation for our interest in Yertf'8h1en in connection vith the epistemological basls of Scheler' s value theory. Mu.ch of the Fol"lDB.lismns, partieularly the first half', 1r8.S wri tten in the form of a cri tique of previous philosophic th.eories rather than as positive philosopby. Positive phllosophizing tends to be set forth by Scheler once previous theories have been judged defective, and tlms in response to clearly atated need. Scheler states in bis ForelfON to the firet edi tion that he bas nt) pretense of discovering pa si tive truth through criticlsm of previous theories. Another cbaracteristic of the FormaliSllll1S ls the amount of discussion devoted to excursions into psychology, sociology, and philosõ of religion which Scheler found required in order to demonstrate that values had objective existence 4 and vere available to the consciousness of the individual lmman subject.1 Scheler reaches such a position tbrough cri ticism of etbical formalism, which attributes value only to disl'Ositions of the buman agent and leaves no place for the existence of values as realities among other objective contents of the universe. Scheler regarded the Formalismu.s as central 2 in importance for an understaDding of bis .ork and even as late as 1926 stated tbat the Formalismus, vith the exception of Section 6~ A, 3d, still represented bis value theor,y Bince he had. in no ws:y based it on metaphysical or religious assumptions' (IIIBDY of which for Scheler bad undergone notable al teration) • In bis introduction to the Formalismu.s Scheler sets forth the main questions vith which he will be concerned. Kantian ethics is to be cri ticized because Scheler regards i t as the most rigorous and vell developed expression of etbical formalisme The Formalismus discusses the following eight presuppositions, a1l of wbich must be refuted if Scheler's theory of non-formal value is to be accepted: 1. A:ny non-forma! ethic must necessar:l.l.y be an ethic of goods and ends. 2. A:ny non-forma! ethic is necessarily only of empirica1l7 1See FormaliSllD1S. p. 9, .. here, in the context of bis Fo:reword to the firet edi tion Scheler comments that he bas adopted the method of descending to the concrete, vhereby the sphere of the .!. priori ideas is enlarged far beyond the pure and "practical formal" spheres lIhicb. Kant recogoized. 2See Foreword to the second edition of the FormaliSlllllS for Scheler's COlIIJIents on the relation of certain of bis conclusions in the FoN.li smns to bis other lIOrks. 'See Foreword to the third edition ot the FormaliSES. inductive and A posteriori valiclity; õ a forma! ethic 1s A priori certain, independently of inductive experience. ;. Arq non-forma! ethic 1s necessarily an ethic based on the outcome of action, and only a forma! ethic C8l1 present the disposition of the agent or the will arising fl'Om this clisposi tion as the primary bearer of the values • good 1 and Ibad 1 • 4. Arq non-forma! ethic 1s necessarily hedonism and 1s based on the ex1stence of sensual states of pleasure bound to objects. Only a forma! ethic 1s, in sboving moral values and in establishiDg moral noms which are founded on these values, able to avo1d consideration of sensual states of pleasure. 5. Arq non-formal ethic is necessarily hetel'Onomous; õ a fo1'll8l etb.1c 1s able to establ1sh. and to gaarantee the autonolÇ' of the indi vidual. 6. Arq non-formal ethic leads only to simple legal1ty of behavior, õ a formal etbic 1s able to establish. the morality of the vill. 5 7. Any non-forma! ethic pu.ts the lmman person in the service of bis ovn conditions or of goods which are alien to him; õ a formal. ethic 1s able to sh.ov and to establ1sh. the dign1 ty of the hmDan person. 8. A:rr3 non-formal ethic JIIllSt in the end locate the basis of aU ethical valuations in the instinctive egoism of human nature; only a forma! ethic 1s able to lay' the foundation for a moral lav valid for aU rational beings, independent of all ego1sm and of aU the 1 particular forms of organ' zation of buman nature. 11. Alle materiale Ethik muss notwendig Gaterund Zvec1oethik sein. 2. Alle materiale Ethik ist notwendig von nur empirisch 1nduktiver und aposteriorischer Gel tuDg; nur eine forma!e Bthik 1st a priori und unabh!ngig von induktiver Ertahrung ge1fiss. ;. Alle materiale Bthik 1st notwendig Erfolgsethik, und nur eine formale Bth1k loem1 ale ursprflngl1cben !rAger der Werte gut und b8se clie Gesinnnng oder das gesinnnngsvo1le Wollen ansprecben. 4. Alle materiale Btb1k 1st notvendig HedoDiSllllS und geht auf das Dasein s1nnlicber InstzustlDde an den Gegenstlb:iden zurtlck. Bar eine formale Bth1k vermag bai der Au:fwe1sung der si ttlichen Werte und der Begrftndnng der au! 1hnen bãnden si ttlicben Norman den H1nbl1ck au! sitml'cbe Instzustbde zu verme1den. 5. Alle materiale Ethik 1st notvend1g heteronom, nur clie formale Bthik vermag clie Autonomie der Person !lU begrllnden und festzustellan. 6. Alle materiale Bthik ff.Ihrt zu blosser Iegalitlt des Bandelns, und nur die formale Ethik vermag die Horali Ut des Yollens zu begrftnden. 6 Scheler bas thus clearly told us what a nõformal theory of value is l!e!. The following twelve pages present a SUIIIID8l"1 of Scheler' s theory of non-formal value for the purpose of allowing the reader not familiar vi th the ForJl!!!liSllDlS ta understand the vider context in which Scheler sali' the more technica1 questions vi th which 1 t 1s our intention ta deal in the main body of this discussion. It should be noted that Scheler's positive philosophie staternents, rather than bis criticism of the eight presuppos1 tions listed above, vill be emphas1zed. Scheler agrees wi th Kant that the moral value of the lmman vill mst bo independent from existiDg tbiDgs and ends. There are no sucb. things as "good ends" and "bad ends". Only the ~ vh1cb. strives tovard sorne end bas value. Ends have value only as value 18 abstracted from the related willed act. But Scheler parts company vith Kant when the latter concludes that no ethic can therefore consider values of a non-formal nature. Thus Kant states: "AU practica1 princ1ples lI'hich presuppose an object (matter) of the capac1ty to desire as the ground of the determination of the will, are entirely empirica1 and cannat produce a:ny lava of 7. Alle materiale Ethik steU t die Persan in den Dienst ibrer eigenen ZustAnde oder ihr fremder Gtlterdinge; DUr die formale Ethik vermag die WfJrde der Person auf'zuweisen 1Uld zu begrt1nden. 8. Alle materiale Etbik DIIlSS in letzter Linie den Grand aller eth1schen Wertschltzu:agen in den triebhaften Egoismus der menschlichen Natl1rorganisation verlegen, und DUr die formale Bthik vermag ein von alla BgoiSlllllS 1Uld aller besonderen menschlichen Natl1rorgan1 sation unabhlngl.ges, far aile Vermmttwasen 'flberhaupt gf11tiges SitteD88setz zu beg:rl2nden, FOrmaliSlllllS, pp. 30-31. AU English translations of quotations froll the Formalismu.s are mine as there 1s no pablished BDglish translation. action. l underatand by matter of the capaci ty 1 to desire, an object lI'hose actuali ty is desired.7 Scheler wants to a1low etbics to continue to consider -thE: values which express themselves in these goods" CP. 36). For Scheler, l1nlike Kant, value concepts (Vertbegriffe) are not abstracted !!:s!!! goods but find "the plenti tude of their content in the autonomous phenomena" CP. 36). Scheler insists that the value orientation of the w:l.1l is immediateq given independent of a1l ends and is not determined by empirical ends. Scheler compares values to colora. "As li ttle as the nsmes 11'8 give to colora designate mere properties of corporeal tbjngs; ••• as little do the zuunes that we give to values indicate mere properties of the units, given in the shape of things, which Ils call goods."2 Values C8D be represented (to oneself) as independent of SIJY thing which might possess these quali ties.. The sensor:ially agreeable quali ty, a value quali ty, of sn apple is not reducible to e:ny other quali ties of the apple. In most cases language does not distinguish value quali ties and their supports save by fundamental sensations (for example, that 50mething bitter is disagreeable). Mal:Jy values are concep~ inde1"Alle praktischen Prinzipien, die ein Objekt (Haterie) des BegehrungsvermZSgena als Bestimmm:lgsgrund des Villena voraussetzen, sind insgesamt empirisch und ldSrmen keine praktischen Gesetze abgeben. 100 verstehe unter der Materie des BegehrungsverBlgens einan Gegenstand, dessen Virklichkei t begehrt wird." (Kr • .9,. l!:. • .1., Erster Teil, 1. Band, 1. Hauptst.), As quoted by Scheler, FormaliSllllS, p. 34. English translation is mine. 2"80 wenig wie die FarbeDl181ll8Il sur blosse Eigenschaf'ten von ldSrperlichen Dinge gehen • • .:, 50 wenig gehen auch die N'amen fflr Verte &Ut die blossen Eigenschaf'ten der dj nglich gegebenen EiDhei ten, die 1Iir Gtlter neunen." Formalismus, p. 35. 8 fiDable. Though 119 SODll.. ."1' grasp vha.t a "noble herse" 18 we are tmable to l1st the essential properties common to aU noble herses vi thout somathing, which is essential to this value, eluding our grasp. lt is therefore clear to Scheler tbat a1l attempts to reduce valuea to ~sica1 attributes C8ll only lead to errors in analysis, and necessarily 50, sinee this confounds value vi th supports of value. Scheler concludes: .• • • , tbat there S1'e authentic and true value quali ties, which consti tute a special ï=ë8J.m. of objects, which have their special relations and connections, and which. aven as value guali tiea can be, for example, higher and lover, etc. But if this is the case then, too, an order and a hierarchy can preva11 between these values, which are totally independ.ent of the eXistence of the vorld of goods in vhich they appear, as vell as of the movements and changes of this vorld of goods in history, and which is ,!! Fori for our experience of this world of goods. Scheler rejects the objection tbat he bas succeeded in showing only that values are not properties of things and thus aUovs one ta maintain that "povers, facul ties, and dispositions" of things are capable of determining certain affective states and appetites in sensing and desiring su'bjecta on the basis of vhich value judgements are made (P. :sa). This theory, Scheler saya, vould explain value preference either by the quantity of these "povers" in a thing or by the subjective consideration of vhat 1 ft. • • , dasa es echte und vahre Wertqualitlten gibt, die ein eigenes Bereich von GegenstAnden darstellen, die ihre besonderen Verh!ltnisse und Zussmmenh!nge haben, und schon ale Yertgualitlten z. B. hmler und niedriger usv. sein ldSnnen. lst aber dies der FaU, 50 kann zvischen ihnen auch eiDe Ordmmg und eine Rangerdpnpg obwalten, die vam Dasein eiDer Gtlterwelt, in der sie zur Erscheimmg koDDllt, desgleichen von der Bevegung und VerAnde1"llDg dieser Gdterwelt in der Geschichte ganz unabbBngig und fflr deren Erfabrang ",!! priori" ist." FemeU SIIII1S, pp. '37-'38. 9 0U1" senses respond to most strongly. The first alternative makes values occu.lt qualities sinee such "powers, faculties, and dispositions" do not enst, while the second identifies values vith affective responses. It is rather the case tbat values are phenomena which are clearly' graspable by affective perception (kl.are :f'tDlil.bare PhBnomene) (P. 39). It is a fact for Scheler that values are given to us immediately, vith clarity and evidence, independent of experience of the supports of these values. Therefore values are inde pendent of their supports "in their bein€' (P. 40). AU value relations, for example, that of the superiority of one object to another, are grasped in the same immediate vay (P. 41). Values and their hierarcby' do not cha.n8e though SUJ)ports may change value. Values are likewise distinct from the affective states and the desires by which we experience them CP. 42). Good and evil, liloe other values, are non-formal and clearly graBJ)able by affective perception (klar und ftnùbare) (P. 47). Liloe ail other value pb.enomena they camlOt be defined. Because there is a hierarchy of non-forma! values the realization of a given non-forma! value can i tself be good or bad. The value good is that which appears in the âS! of realization of the su.preme value (p. 47), while the relative~ good value is that which appears in an act oriented towards the realization of a su.perior value (p. 48). Since the fact that a value is superior is given to us in an act of preference (the latter are acts of l..-nowledge and not of will, hence they are nei ther good nor bad), the moral.ly good act is the act of realizing values Yhich are in accord vi th the preferred value. Non-formal ethics i8 therefore possible if the good or evil value 10 of value rea1izations is based on the hierarchical order of other non-formal values (p. 48). The following are arloms of such a non-formal ethics: 1. 1. The existence of a positive value 1s 1tself a positive value. 2. The nonexistence of a positive value 1s 1tself a negative value. 3. The existence of a negative value is itself a nega ti ve value. 4. The nonerlstence ~f a negative value 1s 1tself a positive value. Good and evil are the values of persons, of the being of such of persons (p. 50). The value of a person 1 s will depends on the value of the person (p. 50). Strivings are not necessarily oriented towards a given end (p. 54). For example, an internal urge may not at first have an end in viev ~p. 54). A. second type of striving includes Wegstreben and Fortstreben (striving to remove ourselves and striving to go before). Unlike repllsion in the face of a certain state (Viderstreben), this type of striving bas no goal originaJJy (p. 54). A. th1rd and completely dis"tinct type of striving is that in wh1ch there 1s an orig:i.nal internal orientation (p. 55). Ve become clearly and distinctly conscious of th1s orientation when our striviDg ancounters a value which corresponds to or contradicts the orientation. Such an orientation may be towards a certain value (which need .!!2!. have 11• 1. Die Erlstens eines positiven Vertes ist selbst ein positiver Vert. 2. Die Nichtex1stenz eines positiven Vertes ist selbst ein negativer Vert. 3. Die Existenz eines negativen Vertes 1st selbst em negativer Yert. 4. Die Nichtex1stenz eines negativen Vertes ist selbst eb positiver Vert. FormaliSllll1S, p. 48. See Formali smns, p. 49 for addi tional arloms. 11 al.re~ been given as a f'tIhlba%'e Vertgual1:tlt) rather tban to a specifie content or detend.oed object (p. 55). A ~ourth type of atriviDg 1a that in which the spec1f'1c content of the goal ia gi'9'8D (p. 55). Scheler IlUSt DOW consider ho1r value 1s immanent to striviDg. The values are giTen to us ilaediate~ in affective perception, but it ia impossible that an affective state (Getflhl) should produce the striviDg and that sueb an affective state (fOl" eDllple, pleasure) should be the goal of the strivbg (p. 57). The imIIediate content of the goal vould IlOt be the pleasure as sucb, but the value of this pleasure (p. 57). Hence the hedoDistic assumption tbat man bas an original striving tovards pleasure is false. In reality pleasure is a goal of striving õ when it is intentiõ viewed as a value or non-value (p. 57). Values can be given and preferred outside of aU strivings (p. 58). Value judgements can be subjeet to illusion. Such illusion is COIIIIÕ pl'Oduced vhen va attribute a positive value to somethiDg becauae it attracts us and. a negative value ta 80JIlethiDg either because it repela us;:,or _ C!DDOt attain it. It ia erroneous ta accept the princip le of Spinoza tbat good ia what 118 desire and bad that which repela us, tor tbis reducea good and bad to -entia ratiolds" (p. 59). There can be a willed end õ if there bas first been a representation õ a goal õ striviDg. In the end of the will the content of the goal is given as somethiDg to be realized. Values do DOt depeDd on ends, but rather ends and the will on values (p. 62). Kant vas in error when he tound "inclinationsto be axiologi~ indif'terent, tor the 1d.ll. 18 good inaõar as 1 t chooses the higbest value 8IIODg tboae which 12 already belong to 1 ts inclinations. !he will 1s thus dependent on the inclinations for the content gong which 1 t chooaes (p. 6'). 1'here 1s, despite Kant's contrar,y opinion, an order of preference 8aOng striviDgs prior tG an &Ct of will (P. 64). Ali unities of meaning and 1deal princ1ples, which are selt-given due to the 'contents of an ~te intuition, are A priori (p. 69). The contents of such an intuition are given in a VeHDSscbau, a vision of essences. !rhe "what" given here CaDDOt be lION or less given, 1t e1ther 1s "1taelfM given or 1t 1s not grasped intuitive:q and thus 1s not given. !he princ1ples of the laws of connect1on of essences are alao giTen A priori and are tru.e A priori (p. 69). That which 1s A priori U3 be e1ther fol"llal. or non-formal (p. 74). Kant 1188 in error vhen he 1dentified the fomal. and. the A priori (p. 74). lie are first givan goods, not thiDgs. Secondl.y, through affective perception values appear. ~ and qui te iDdependant:q, appear the affective states (Getahl.szustlDde) of pleasure and displeasure which relate us tG the af'f'ective action of the goods on us. Then cooee :,the &tfective states mixed with the above. !l'hese are the specifical.l1' senaorial &tfective states, vhich, Scheler notes, Carl Stumpt wll called "affective sensations" (Ge:tfDüseapfiDdU!!B'8lll. It 1s hence clear that aensorial atf'ective states are never imMeliate:q giftn (p. SO). The eftect of the sensorial &tfective states on what the will has as an end 1s essential.ly' negative. !bat 18, tbey wq iD. part detel'lliDe what ve will cease to will, but.!!e1 what W8 will origine]],. w1l.l (p. 82). Kant therefore _ch overrated the significance of the uperience of l' pleasure and displeasure for the content of the will (p. 83). It 1s false to 1d811tif'y the .!. priori vith the rational and the .!. posteriori wi th the sensible. The J! priori 1s the ilmediateq iDtuitive "given-. Liloe1rise propos1tions are A priori onq iDsofar as the7 rece1ve a content of facta froll. pheDOlll8nal experience CP. ~}. ÜJere 81'8 original. J! priori constituants of the vill and of the eDIOtiOnal vhich are DOt borrowed from thoU8ht. The axioJlS of arlolog are qui te independent of loglcal arloms (p. 84). The presupposition that all aspecta of the hwaan. spirit are e1 tb.er rational or I!I8nsible 1s false (p. 85). S'tudy of sentillents, of love and hate, does DOt establish ethics on an. empirical or sensible bas1s - (p. 85). Tbere 19 an .!. prlori of the emotional (p. 85), qui te distinct froa any inductive experience. Kant 1Ia8 in error to assume tbat Ybat is "given" 1s a "chaos vithout order" (p. 86). The.!. priori 1s rather tbe real objective structure (die 88cbl1che seB!D8t1nd11 che Strulttur) ed DOt at all imposed bl" reason on the matter of experience (P. 87). In the case ybere a value and 1ts hierarcbic range 1s "self-gi:ven" and 1s thua absoluteq evident the Socrat1c princ1ple that knowl.edge ot the good determ:iD.es the will holds (p. 89). Judgements ot Ybat 1s good, not based on af'tective perception of value, do not, hovever, have force te dete1'lliD.e the vill, hence the Socratic principle IllU8t be qualitied (p. 90). The subjective and the .!. priori are DOt liDked (P. 96). The l 1a onq a su.pport of values, DOt an evaluatiDg su.bject who produces values, or that vi thout which values voul.d DOt enst (p. 98). Fo1'll&1.!. priori 14 correlations are those which are independent of value modes and qualities and of the 1dea of value supports, and which are grounded in the essence of values. AU values are positive or negative in tbeir very essence. Brentano • s ax101U re~..1Dg the value of the existence and non-existence of positive and negative value are based on fomal.!, priori correlations. There are s1ll1lar axioms regardiDg obligation (p. 102). These ax10llS are intuitive essential correlations, and are not based on the l.aws of logic. Su.ch ax101BS are relevant ta the will !el orig:l na1 ly, but because and 1nsotar as the will 18 detel'll1ned by value (p. 103). Unlike Kant, Scheler saya that principles such as that of contradiction apply ta thought only because they apply ta aU be1.ng (p. 104). In the realm of values the saM object C8D be regard.ed as both negative and poBi ti ve only by virtue of distinct 1ntentional vien bear1ng on tvo value structures co-existent in the object (p. 104). Moral contlict arises in the case of an opposition between what we 1mov is good and what 1s precious ta us .hether good or not (p. 105). Persons alone of aU value supports can be mõ good or bad. A1l other tbings are 50 only by reterence ta persons (p. 105). Su.per10rity and interiority belong ta the eBsence of values themselves, not s1mply as knom ta us. Brentano* s scheme tor dete:nni ni Dg value superiority and interioriv 1s inadequate. The &Ct in which 118 kno. the SUperiori ty of a value 1s "preferenceand 7IIq be subject ta illusion if 1t i8 not based on self-givenoesa (p. 108). Durabil1ty does DOt necessarily imply superiority (p. 112). Extension and divis1b1lity are associated vith SIlperior value only in the case of mat-'.d.al goods (tor 15 eDilple, f'ood and clothing), not in the case of' sp1ritwü. pda. Renee the criteria of' extension and div1a1b1l1ty, l.ike that of' durab1l1ty, are of' doubtful. s1gDit1cance f'or distiDguish:1ng au.perior and 1n:terior value (p. 114). Certain values are based on other values. For example, the useful 1s based on the agreeable, and the agreeable on the vital. Vital values are b1' essence superior to both agreeable and use:tul values, and in turn the açeeable 1s superior to the use:tul. The sp1r1 tual value hier- ~ cm be grasped only by spiritual acts which are DOt vi tal.ly condi tioned (p. 115). A superior value 1s by essence ODe 1fh1ch 1s less relative to, and less dependent on, other values (p. 116). Values 11&1' be values of' person or of' thiDgs of' value. The latter 'IJIq be material, vital, or spiritual, and are b1'essence iDf'erior to values of' persons (p. 120). The values of' acts (love, hate, nU), f'unCtiODS (s1ght, hearing, affective perception), and reaction (syJIlpã, vengence) are iDf'erior to values of persons, but these of acts are superior to those of f'lmctiODS, and those of' acts and tuDctiODS are superior to th038 of reaction (p. 121). Values of success are lIOt moral, unl1ke the values of sp1r1 tual states or thoae of' actions (p. 121). 'rhe h1e~ of values tbat the above essential relations presuppose must be independent of aU goods vh1ch can, or do, exist and of' aU particular organic structures 1fh1.ch af'fectively' perce1ve value. AU modalities of value, that 1s, systems of' qualities of' value, contain a real value, a tuDctional value, &Dd a value of a state. For ex.aaple, in the .,dall ty of' the agreeable and disagreeable vith 1 ts real values, 16 there 1s also the value of the :tImction of the affective sensorial perception (wi th 1 ts modes of joy and pain), and the value of the affective states of pleasure and aadness (p. 125). ThB.t the agreeable abould be preferred over the disagreeable 1s an A Fiori pr1nc1ple. Vi ta1 and sptri tua! values are qui te independent from one another and f'roll II&ter1a1 values (values of' the agreeable). The respective acts of preference and the f'unCtiODS of' affective perception of' the tbree modalities are also quite distinct (p. 127). !l'he last axiologica1 .,dality 1s that of the sacred and the pl'Otanei in winch values appear only in objects intentionally sean &8 absolute (p. 129). The aff'ective states of' th1s modality are beatitude and despal.r (p. 129). A wi1led act bas a JIOral value qui te inde pendent troll the eff'ects this act may have (p. 131). Behavior 18 ruled by the persan' s spiritual state. The spiritual state 1s a given graspable by intuition (p. 137). Behavior D18Y, hovever, mask the true spiri tua! s'tate of a person as 1s sean, f'or Et%8Ilple t in the case of' a DI8D who does the good only because he wisbes to be regarded as a "good man" (p. 1:s6). Practica1 objects of' the will are not pr1mar11y thiDgs perce1"f8d, but rather good8, or things of' value (p. 15'). For 1t 1s only in atf'ective perception of' value (VertfBh.len) that striviDg 1s 1mmediately based, not in an objective content in the f'Ol'll of an image that 81St be represented (vorpstellt) or perce1ved (wahrseno_n). It 1s tlms clear that the possible objects of' the will are selected according to the values which sp1r1 twüly correspond to the sp1r1 tual state .1rhich f'oUDds the will (p. 15'). Each persan' s value atttiildèe are based on a partic17 ular hierarchy of the rules of preference which rul.e our inclinations in a1l eapirical situations. !hua 1t 1s that the same eapirical situation CSD present quite different values ta two individuals (p. 162). Scheler begins Part II of the Formal18111l1S by stating tbat a1l kDo1rledge 1s rooted in experienC8 (ErfahruDg) (p. 179). Ethica III1St also be toanded on experience. The probleJll, however, 1s tbat of determining vhat constitutes the essence ot the experience tbat gives us moral knowledBe and what are the essential elements of such an experience. Bow are moral tacts ta be distinguisbed troJll other facts? "lforal tacts" are not f'ound in iDner perception (imleren YahrDehlamg) (p. 181). Bor are the,. 1deal objects ta be grasped b,. reason iD the JII8.ml8r that the concept ot triangle 1s (p. 181). Ye DIllSt set aside the old duality of reason and sensib1l1ty' (P. 181). According ta Scheler, a child senses the goodness and care of 1 ts mother thOU8h 1 t haB not the least 1dea of the concept "good" (P. 182). Ve grasp the moral qual1 t1es of other persons in the same fashion. Moral facts are theretore facts of non-formal intuition (materialen hachammg), that 1s, they are imlaediately g1ven (p. 182). RatiOnaliSll bas reveraed the proper order by assuming that value exists in actualllOrld. objects onq by comparison ta the "good", the s!. real.isSÙlWll. In reali V values belong originaU,. ta a1l degreea of' beiilg (p. 183). Etbical Jl(II!I1na lj SIl 1a also rejected by Scheler. Ve often maloe judgements of value about things or persoDS tavards which 118 teel no enthusisSll or iDdignation. !he value 1s IlOt less fUll,. given tbough our aftective state 18 D8Utral. Likewise a value ca remaiD 1dentical 18 as given to us though our atf'ective state and lts expression cban8e. Ve C8D grasp values which are DOt realisable by tJ:IJY striviDg or which do not correspond to the orientation of 8D7 striving present to us. Our universe of values .ould be far poorer if tbis ore DOt the case and 118 could grasp only those values to which va had an actual striving (P. 189). Ve thiDk we live in a common universe of values, one whicb. ls common because 1t ls objective, and ve distinguish from 1t both our subjective aptitude to grasp it and our degree of interest in its various eleJllents (p. 190). When va say "This man 1s good" ve _an to ref'er to an objective reality, DOt the express10n of' our striviDgs CP. 190). Such tacts as these cannot be expla1ned by etbical DOminal1sm, but õ byan objective axiology (p. 191). UtilitariaDisa is in error insofar as 1t supposes 1tself to be a theor,y of' good and evil in themselves, vh1le in tact 1 t 1s only a theory of' social praise and blame, applied to good and bad (p. 195). AU attempts to reduoe original moral exper1ance to a product of 8lr! a:d.ological.ly neutral experience are doomed to failure CP. 196). Tlms Scheler also rejects Brentano, Herbart, and sm. th in their assertions tbat value ls produoed by appreciation (p. 196). AU ideal obligation 18 based on value, and 1s oriented tovard the exclusion of no!l-value (p.. 224). Thus aU proposi tiona expressiDg an obligation rest on a positive value, but do DOt contaiD this value. Obligation cannot oppose disC81'1U18Dt of .bat 1s posi tively pd, but can only bave a purely' negative character. 19 It 1s hoped tbat th1s SWIIIIIIn'7, while no subatitute for knoll'ledge of the first tb1rd of the 1'ol"ll8l1S11118 1 tself, will provide the reader untami}jar with that work a pre1111i nery context for the d18CU8Sion to follo1r. Other aspects of the Formal1SJ1118 w1ll be discussed as they become important for a pl'Oper evaluation and understsDding of the impl1catioDS of the doctrine of Yert1'8hl.en. Scheler' a doctrine of Yertf'8h1en and his use of affective perception are best understood agaiDst the philosophie background froll which the,. arose. Consequent~ va will trace the history of affective perception as a cogni ti va pr1nc1ple tbrough the wr1 t1ngs of Franz Brentaoe and Edmnnd Husserl. Ve w1ll then be iD a position to consider Scheler's notion of Vertf'flhlen and 1 ta role iD his ethics in greater detail as vell as to establ1sh which aspects of the theory vere orig:l.nal. to Scheler. The phenomenologLcal method of Scheler JII1St be d1st1ngu:1.sbed rrom tbat of Husserl. Our task vill then be to evaluate Vertffthl.en. as 1 t 1s conce1ved of by' Scheler. In th1s context ve vill be concerned ri th the existence of affective perception iD the Schelerian sense and 1 ts ab111 ty to perfom the requ1red cognitive f'lmction, the objectivi1;y of values and the value hierarcb1', the problema of error and 11 1ns1on, and the necessary nature of an ethic based on YertfBhlen. ~ FormaliSlllllS .Y1 ~ ;;;;B ..... tb;;;:;ik-. ~ ~ materiale Vertethik 1s the york of Scheler's upon vh1ch the discussion will be based, for the .,st part, as 1t 1s his principal eth1cal YOrk and. the one he regarded as key for an un.d.erstsDding of the reat of his writiDgs. CH&P.l'ER '!'Vo Franz Brentano inf'luenced both Husserl' s and Scheler' s views ot aff'ecti 'ft perception. Psychology was det1ned by Brentano as "die Yissenschaf't von den psychischen Erscheim1D8enlt1 or Itthe science ot 2 mental appearances." Througbout the Pstcholofde Brentano uses the tem Itpbenomenon" (Ph'no!8!Ù as a syDOJl1JI f'or the te1'll "appearance" (Erscbe:Jnnng) • Brentano states that "vi th the nsme mental phenolll8na 118 desigoate representations, as vell as an those appea:rances tor vhich representations consti tute the basis."' Representations are the basis tor an Enta! acts, because "nothiDg can be judged, nor can. anythiDg be desired, notbing can be hoped tor or teared, if it 1Franz Brentano, P81cholosie l:9!! empirischen Standpmkt (Isipsig: Danc1oer und. BIlIlblot, 1f114), l, p. 24 hereatter cited as D!§.. AU Engl1ah translations ot quotations troll lX!! are mine as there vas no BDgliah translation readiq avaUable to M. 2psxchiachen ia translated as "aen.ta!1t rather than "psychic" in accord vith the usage eatabl1sbad by' Roderick Il. ChiahOla in his Engliah translation of' Brent8no'a Yahrheit und Evidens. SM The True ~ .!!!. Evident. lDndon: Routl.ed&e and Kegan Paul, 1966. - - '''Kit clea llamen. der psychiscben PhIDo.aoe bezeichneten 1i1r die Vorstel.luDgen, sowie auch alle jeoe Br8che1.imDgen, far welche Vorstellungen die Grund'ag8 bilden. Il PVES. p. 104 • • 20 21 1 is not represented." By tb1s arguJl8Dt Brentano inteDded to establisb. clearly the priority ot representation among aU Ental acta. Vith the notion ot intentioDality, which he regarded as a positive comon cbaracteristic ot IlAD.ta1 phenomena,2 and which vas later to become a flmdamental notion tor phenomenology, Brentano set torth the relation between the "objective" and "subjective" aspects ot mental e:z:perience. In ~ Origin gt.!l!!. Knovlec1se ,g! Bight .e!i YroDPj the intentional relation is said to be "to so_thing which, though perhaps not real, is none the less an iJmer object ot perception.'" ~sica1 phenomena are grasped only by "outer" perception. The class ot appearances ot mental phenomeua are characterized by' the "intentional inexistence ot objects, ,,4 vnlike the class ot ~cal phenomena. "Intentional inexistence" signifies the perceptibll1ty ot an object ~ in iJmer consciousness, vbere consciousness is detined as arJ7 "mental appearance" (psych18Che Erscbeinung) i1'lsotar as it haB a content.' 1 "liichts loem1 beurteilt, Dichts loeml aber auch begebrt, Dichts kaIm gehottt oder gefflrchtet _l'den, 1I8Dn es Dicht -rorgestellt wird." POS, p. 104. 2pVES, pp. 115-116. 1-ranz :Brentano, lB!L Origin g.t !t!!. KDowl!de;e .2! fsht g! Vl'Opg. transe Cecil Hague (lDndon: Archibald Constable, 1902 , p. 12, hereatter ci ted as,2. *Zu etna, 1188 v:l.elleicht Dicht 1Ii1'k1ich, aber doch iDnerl1ch ~genstlndl1ch lst,* lraDz Brentano, ~ Ursprnng Bittlicher Erkmmtnis llBlpzig: Dancker und HUIlblot, 1889), p. 14, hereatter cited. as .!m!.. 4pVBS, p. 118. 5PVBS, p. 181. 22 :Methodology vas regarded by Brentano as the source of lIIl1Ch error. Psychology had to be establ1shed on a :f'irm empirical basis, tbat of perception and experience (Wahrnebmung ~ Erfabrung).' Traditional introspection methods (Selbstbeobaeb.tung) vere unsatisfactory since *observation" (Beobachtung) could be only of the n:te~ perceivable.2 Mental phenomena could be grasped only in 1nner perception (1nnere Wahrnelmlup.g). The full implications of tbis distinction emerge later as Brentano maintains tbat imler perception gives a self-evident, adequate, and immediate grasp of mental phenomena, Yhereas pbysical phenomena C8lUlOt be said actually to be as they are grasped. In maki ng sueb. a sharp distinction between the two classes of phenomena Brentano is attempting to allov mental phenomena to be rega.rded as objects of true and evident cognition. Scheler subjects the self-evidence of inner perception to a far more tboroU8h scmtiny than did Brentano. Brentano distinguished three fundamental classes of mental phenomena, each being a distinct type of intentional relation. These tbree fundamental classes (Grm:mk1sssen) vere representation, judgement, and affectivity. Representations, vhich may be of a:rJ.Y object, m'Wever concrete or abstract, are the basis of the other tvo intentional relations, as for example, a judgement is the act of accepting or rejecting an object presented in a representation. The tbird fandamental class is that of "the emotions in the widest sense of the term" ("der Gemfltsbewegungen im wei testen Sinn des Wortes*)3 f'rom the simple forma of inclination or 1 PVES, p. 34. 3 VDSE, p. 16. disinclination in respect ot the mere 1dea, te jor and aadoess ariaiDg tro. conviction and te the !DOst coaplicated pheDolI8D& as te the cho1ce ot ends and 11188D8. ,,1 The intentioDal relation tor this class 1s that ot love or hate, a tom ot pleasiDg or disple~. 2 Representation C8J1 never be in error, 1t e1ther 1a or 1a not, but judgeaent and &ttectivit,y mq be wrong or right.' "Goocl", in 1ts videst sense, 1s "that which cau be 10ved 111. th a ri,ght 1ow,,4 and whicb 1s good!!! 1 taelt • 5 'l'here 1a a distinct10n between torma of judgement and atfectivit,y based on self-evidence, and those basad on instinct or hab1t.6 The princ1ple of contradiction 1a self-evident ta jud.gement 7 and, analogously, that "all men natural.ly des1re knovledge" 18 an e%8Dlple ot a sslt-evident 8 atatement in the sphere of &ttectivit,y. There 1s, ho'WeYer, "DO guarantee that everytbing which 18 good vill arouse vithin us a love vith the character of rightness.n9 Error, at least in the fom of affective inditterence, if not active hate, thus bas not yet been elimiDated. l'or haa aJq criteria for ranld Dg goods been eatablished. The best method. of raDki Dg goods 18 in terms ot preterence, 1.e., 1I'hat good lIOuld be cbosen oYer another good, but this still does DOt tell us how va lI8k:.e 8I1cb a cho1oe, hov V8 .!!!sOE which 1s better.10 To Ba1 'x' 1s better wben the act ot preterring 1t 1s right, as Brentano initia11y suggests,11 seeas onq to 1 ~ p. 14. 2~ p. 16. '2,p. 17. 4 .Q., p. 16. 5 60 18. 7.Q., 18. 8 19 • ~ p. 16. ;:.t p. p. .Q., p. 9 10 110 p.23 • .Q., p. 21. .Q., p. 23. ;:.t 24 involve us in a tautology, and moreo'ftr turns us back to the uncertainties ot self-evidence in affectiv1ty. Chapter Eight, entitled "Einbeit der GrQndk'esse tfIr Ge:f'llhlllDd WilIen", in Book Two, Vol'Ull8 l of P!1chologi. ~ eapirischen Standp!1Dkt is valuable in shoriDg the degree to which Brentano, as coapared wi th Scheler, developed his analysis ot affective perception. It is clear tro. section ODe 1 that thoush Brentano noted ditterences betveen the phenomena ot .Q!.- !1!!! and Yille, Fmù.en and Streben he did not find it possible to assert the existence of categorical distinctions between these phenomena as did Scheler. Brentano hop8s no one will believe h1Il to th1Dk that atfectiTe pheDomena are cognitive acts (Irloenntnissakte) whether of goodnesa or badxless, value or non-value.2 Scheler did DOt attribute tull cognitift statua to all affective perception (Ffth1en) and certai.nl.y not to striviDgs, acts of vill, or ~ affective state (GetlJhl), but he did regard. J.!!j.tfIhlen as cogni t1 ft. Brentano* s f'uDd8JllSntal classes are related iD such a vq that both representations and judgements constitute the bas1s of affectiv1.ty. Thus though atfectiv1ty i8 DOt regarded as cognitive it is based on cognitiTe acte. The problem of error still exista for affectiTity sinee judgements, which though cognitive are subject to error, joiD the representations, vhich are DOt subject to error, in founding the phenomena ot attectiv1ty. Scheler 1f8S able to el1.1nate this particular source of error insotar as he was successtul iD establish1ng Yerttflhlen as illlEdiate and 1 PYES, pp. 306-:510. 2nES, p. :512. 25 elearly' evident, attributes whicb. Brentano would reserve for representations. One of the more valuable sources for diacovering Scheler' a relation to Brentano 1a found in Scheler' s e01D8nta on Brentano' a work in the Formal1SIIID.s 1 tself' • For exam.ple, Scheler notes in pa8a1ng in his discuas10n of the goals of atr1v1ng tbat Brentano vas in error vhen he asserted that a1l acta of d.eatre IlUSt be fcnmded on a representation (p. 60). Scheler, un.l1lte Brentano, differentiatea striv1ngs, whicb. as yet ha"t'8 no specifie object vh1eh could be represented, trom acta of will oriented tovards a specifie end. In the FoI'll8.l.1S1lUS, as ve have already noted, Scheler assens tbat in the phenomenology of values and of the emotiooel. lite there 1a an.!. priori objectivity independent of logic, ot reaaon, and of sensib111t,y (p. 85). It is in the end the J!. prioritx of love and hate tbat constitutes the fOUDdation of aU other J!. prioritx, that of being, as 11811 as tbat of will for contents. It 1a in th1s .!. prioritx tbat theory and practice are ultimately' united in the phenomenological sche_. Scheler noted that Brentano had already set forth an &Dal.ogoua opinion (p. 85, n. 1). Ve have al.ready noted Scheler' s use of Brentano' a .!. priori a:d.OIDS ot the enstence and non-existence of positive and negative value (p. 102). Scheler rejeeta BrentaDo* a 8%10118 vhereby a value, tbat is the S1DIl of valuea v1 and v2, is at the aame tiJII8 a value IRlperior to valuea v1 2 and T. Scheler al.so rejeeta Brentano' 15 identification of auperior aDd preterred value. Preference la our JIl8ans of aceess to auperior Talue, but lIq be aubject to illusion. Scheler also finda 1 t iapoas1ble to 26 follow :Brentano in his decision to leaVè the problea of forming an actual hierarchy of values to historical relativity (p. 107, n. 1). Scheler fima BrentanO to be ald.n to Maa Smith and to Herbart in that they aU demed the existence of autonomus ethical value phenomena by main1:aining that appreciation need DOt be oriented by value and that value only appears, or ls produced, in or tbroue;h apprec1ation (p. 196). The relation between Husserl and Scheler is somevhat problematic. Scheler vas a younger contemporary of Husserl, who C8D19 to his on f'ull developaent af'ter Husserl did, vas influenced strongly by Husserl 's ear~ YOrk, and yet soon diverged tram the path which Husserl thought phenoJll8nology must follov. Scheler diecl in 1928, before the orig1n.al text of Husserl's Cart8sian Meditations appeared, and lIIl1st necessar1ly have been quite unaware of JIIOst ot the ethical theories which are found in Huaserl's unP'lblished JII8JlUSCripts. The Idee, which appeared in 191', is the lateat of Husserl' s publisb.ed vorka wi th whicb. 118 can be reasonably certain Scheler vas f81ld.liar at the tiE when he vrote the Fol'llaliBllD18. In the Ideen, when Husserl sets forth tbe natural stsndpoint of the l in the world, he sqs that "this vorld is DOt there for me as a .are world ~ tacts.!è. affaira, but, vith the aaae iJmlecliacy, as a world,g! values, a world ~ pds, a practical vorld. _1 Values belong to -the 1Bëdmnd Husserl, ldeas: General Introduction to Pu.re PheDOlI8JlOloQ, trans. Y. R. Boyce GibBOn (LoDdoJl: George Allen andUiiVii, 19,1), p. 10:5 hereatter cited as ldeas. For GeDl81l, "Dabei iat dieae Welt tir II1ch nicht da ala eine blosse Sacbemrelt, sondern in derselben Umdttelbarbit ala Wertewelt, Qlterwelt, I!1'!!l5ti.sche!!li. ft aee Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu eiDer reioeJl PbInoIl8DOlõe und PhInoll8D.Olod8chen Philo so pbie , ed. Waller Memel, iD. Husser11aD& Haaii' lIartiJIua llijhoff, 1950), III, 59 hereafter ci tad as Ideen. conati tution of the 'actue' Il present' objects as such, irrespective of rq turm.Dg or not turm.Dg to coDSider them or indeed any other objects." 1 Liloenrise lI8l1 are 1lfY *friends* or JIf3 *foes", 1lI3' "servants* or "superiors", *straD&era" or "relatives". 2 lt is to such a varld that the Jll8Difold forma of cODSciousness, includiDg "the diverse acts and states of sentiaent and will: approval and diaapproval, jo," and sorrow, desire and. aversion, hope and fear, decision and action,,3 relate. Other egos experience the varld in like Jll8DDer though for each ego "the fields of perception and memor,y actually present are different" and are "knovn in dif'ferent ways", are "diff'erently appreheDded" and show "different grades of clearD8ss*.4 Yet we are able to "set up in cOlllllOn an objective Spatio-tellporal fact-vorld. ,,5 It should be noted that Husserl bas thus left i t open to question vhether i t is possible to set up in COIIIIIOD a vorld of goods and values. The eSS8ntial property of COnsciousn8ss is to be a CODSciOl1SD888 .!!! something. AlI 8xperiences vhich have this essential property are called "intentional experiences" (intenti:.'!!!l!. ~lebnisse) and are *intentionally related." (intentional beso.n) to th1s SOJll8tbing .2! which they 6 are conscious. This relation 1s DOt one between a psychological event 1ldeas, p. 103. For German, "geboren konstitutiv su den *vorlwideD.en* Objekten als solchen, ob 1ch mich ilmen und den Objekten 1lberhaupt zuweDde oder Dicht,* see ldeen, p. 59. ~deas, p. 103. See ldeen, p. 60. 4rdeas. p. 105. See ldeen, p. 62. 3 ldeas, p. 103. See ldeen, p. 60. 5ldeas, p. 105. For Geman, "setsen geaeinsaa eiDe objektive rIwIlich-Be1tliche Yirklichloe1 t,* see ldeen, p. 62. 6 ldeas, p. 119. See l4HI1, p. ~. 28 and some otber 1'8al enstent (Duein). 1 !he so_thing vbich 18 grasped 1s not the fact as liftd in the vorld but "the pure essence grasped 1deational.l1' as pure 1dea", the '" â Fiori essence in uncondi tioned nec8ssivtr.2 !he spberes of sentilllent and will contain maD3" varied intentioD8l stratifications, noetic and DOematic. "~objects, things, qualities, the various Jl&tters 1fhich are taken in valuing to have value and the corresponding noemata of the representations, ,1udgements, etc., on vh1ch the consciousness of value rests," must be distiDguished !rom "the objects and contents of value themselves, or the DOematic modifications corre8pondiDg to these, and then generaJ.llr the co.plete noemata vh1ch belong to the concrete consciousness of value. ,,3 If a cognitive intention is to result iD. the action of a subject in relation to the object there IIIlSt also be an affective intention. This means that affective intentionality is presupposed by the actift life of the subject. Atf'ective intentionality is not siaple avareness of, but a reacbing of the subject tovards, the object.4 .A:f'!ect1ve acts, such as apprec1ation have a double intentionalit;r.5 The "'subject matter', ~!!!! si!ple" ("bloseen 'Sache''') IIIlSt be distinga.1shed !roa the .!!!! 1 Ideas, p. 119. Bee Ideen, p. 8>. ~deas, p. 120. See Ideen, p. 8>. 3zdeas. p. Z76. For Gel!'ll8!l, "die GegenstllDde, DiDge, BeschafteDheiten, Sachverhal te, die 1a Verten ala Verte dastehen, bD. die entsprechenden .oemata der Vorstell'UD&8n, Urte1le u.dgl., welche das Vertbewusstsein tundieren ••• die Vertverhalte selbst, bn. die 1hnen entsprechenden DOematischen ModifikatioD8B., UDd daim 1Iberhaupt die dea koDkreten Vertbewusstsein zugehlSrigen vollstlndigen BoeMll," see Ideen, p. 237. 4zdeas, p. 122. Bee ldeen, p. 82. 5Ideas, p. 122. Bee .Ideen, p. 83. 29 intentional abject" ("ToUen intentiooelen Objekt,,).1 That 1Ih1ch ls valud or enjoyed "first becomes an apprehended object through a d1stinctively 'objectif1iDg' ~,91. thougbtlt • 2 Thoush affectivity ls fmmded on a cognitive type of int8ntiooel1t;y, such as representation and judgement, lt has a cogDitive tlmction of its own as vell. Complex phanoll8na are cognitive, or noetic, because 1t ls the "essential na:ture" ("seine WeMn") of intentiooel experience "to barber in itself a 'meaning' of soma sort.'" Husserl includes in representation aU acts in vhich someth1ng is represented as objective to us, 1ncluding so_ aental phenomena which beloDg to Brentano' s th1rd tundamental class, that of aftectivity. For Husserl representation ls involved in ~ act in 1Ih1ch a content is given. Int8ntionali ty as a simple "COnsCiOUBnes8 of", in vhich we are aware of abjects vithout ~ grasping them, 1s distinct froa intuition. In intuition we have a knoving grasp of the object in its genuiDe easentiality. In intuition 118 gain clear and evident 1ns1ght into an object which tbus gains tull "_eni nr: •4 Bu.sserl states that tbere are parallels in the selt-evidenC8 ot the spberes ot rea80n and atf'ectivit;y and v.l.ll.5 "Eve" act, .2.!!!2. eve17 .!S...t-correlate barbera upl1c1 tg ~ impl1ci tg 1 1d888, p. 122. 1dMn, p. 83. ~deas. p. 122. For Germm., "w1rd vielJlehr erat in einer elgel1el1 'verge6!l18t1ndl1 cbeDden' Wend!!l!g SWI erfassten Gegel18tand", see Ideen, p. 82. 'ldeas, p. 257. For Geman, "80 etwas rie e1nen 'SimL' • • • in sich zu bergen," see 1deen, pp. 218-219. 4 1deas, pp. 3EO-381. See 1deen, pp. :534-335. 5 1deas. p. 389. SM 1deen, p. 34'. â 'logica1' factor.-1 Sncb logical factors can alvays be lI8de explicit.2 Renee aU acta, even those of feeling and will ".E!. 'objectifEng' acta. orisinal factors ~ ~ 'consti tuting !JI. Objects'.*' The Taluing consc10wmess constitutes over against the mare world of positiTity the typically 11811 "arlologlca1" objectiTity.4 '!'he rational categories of truth and val1di ty can be applied to acts of feeling and will througb "objectifivation" (*Objektivierung") of the latter.5 The objectiTity of arlology 1s founded on the concept of eTidenee. Intuitions are ~ adequate and evident if they are given as "~!!!:!.-dvenne15S- ("reine SelbatsesebeDhe1t").6 In the Fomal.i811W5 Scheler mentioJl8 Hnaserl' 8 work occasioD&lly and never in cr1ticiSil. The tone of aU bis COlllllll8D.ts ls that ot praiae and apprec1ation, vhether in the 1916 Foreword where he attribute8 the unity of the pbenoll8nologica1 approach to Husserl, or in the later passages vhere he refers the reader to Husserl's critique of n01l1n811 _, notes tbat he 1a using a te1'll in the partieular sense set forth b.Y Husserl, distinction betveen tvo concepts, etc. From Husserl Scheler took the notion tbat objects are 1Ddeed imediately glTen and that vhat 1s selt-given!! as it 1a 'meant'. 1 ldeu, p. '22. !'or Geman, "Jeder Akt. l.!!!. jedes .Aktkorrelat bire !!l.!!ê!!!. 'lDgisches' mlizite ~ iIlplinte,* He IdMll. p. 290. ~deas, p. 332. Bee Ideen. p. 290. 'Ideu, p. 332. See Ideen, p. 290. ~clea.s. p. 332. 5Ideas, p. 4fn. Idee. p. 360. 6I clea.s, p. 194. Ideen, p. 156. '1 Husserl was more caretul than BrentaDo in notiDg tbat perceptual 1llus10na in regard to one' s OVD experience could produce error in knowledge based on imler perception. Scheler found BrentaDo to have been eorreot to regard imler perception adequate~ given as val1d, tbough he agreed vi th Husserl that caution vas requ1red. It 1s the doctr:l.De of essential intui tion which 18 uaed by Scheler as the foundation for his theory of value. Scheler did not regard Husserl as hanng escaped :t'rom the traditiooel dual1 t;y of reason and sensib111 ty. 1 !he theais of the intentional1t;y of affectivity, vh1ch 1s found iD. Brentano and Husserl, becue a fsr mo1'8 important concept in Scheler's vork. :Both Husserl and Scheler attempted to escape :t'roll the subjectiviSIR that threatened :BrentaDo's theory of value. The principal gult between Husserl and Scheler lies in the d..it:t'erence between the natures of their experienced vorlds. This di:t'terence iD. short 1s that between 1deal1_ and real1a. Husserl speaks of the consciousness as *conati tuting" 1 ts world, and is tbws untroubled by the I-object abyss of :Brentano, 1Ih1le Scheler 1s ovenhe1Jdngq insistent on the ab1li ty of the person to grasp the essential in 1 tselt iD. 1 ts objectivity vithout any superposition of structure on the experiencecl objecte On the one band aU structura lies in the experienc1ng subject at one with the i.ntentioDal object, and the aiJl18 to d1BCO't""~ pn'8 essence"s of absolute consc1owmess, .hile on the other band al! structure lies iD. the experienced. object, iD reality 1tselt, 8.D4 the aia 18 1 Bee ldeas, p. 4CI1, or ldeen, p. :560. 32 to discover pare es8t'Uces of 8lJY k1Dd. Paul Landsberg ditterentiated the points of vin of Husserl and Scheler in the followiDg~: La. .thode de ftduction et l' 1déal1 sme traDacendantal oõ daDa les ICWês (Idà8n sm eiDér reiDen Phbo.eoelOde ~ PblnOMnoloSis~Philo80phie) J18 rePî"sentent que 1& prise de oonscienoe du. sens fonda!l8!\tal d'une position.l~ est dé'j~ "'anel1'te aux LoSische UnteraucbuDloen. Déja dans ce premier livre le divorce entre Husserl et Scheler se trouvait doDC ~for1llf: Scheler, cet esprit avide de toute sorte de " rlaU~f' vivant dans une intuition põrphe du riel. Il paràft qu'U y a deux types ~s ditt'rents de philosophes. Iss uns s'efforcent ~ "péDétrer par Une lmlière lim1 tée "les arcanes de 1& réal.i~ cõte et de 1& vie ve'Ca8. Les autres oo.e Husserl aap1rent à 1& clartl absolue, ~ une ré'~on spiriFlle qui pri~e ou transcende l'b11ma" ne .è%istence. One vonders ul timatel,y vbether there 1s DIllch to choose between the respective approa.chs of Husserl and Scheler for in 8lJY theory of value based on e1 tber of these tvo approachs the f'undemental probiélls v1ll be tboee of illusion and error. Scheler can provide no more proof of the Yal.:1dity of bis essential intuitions than Husserl can of the validity of bis constituted esseDC8S. Phenomenology C8D. õ attempt to descr1be i ts intuitions in such a vay that they will be grasped aa valid, aa self-given, by others. There are certain distinctions betveen the pbenoaenological metbods of Husserl and Scbeler wbich JIIllSt be dravn IIOre sbarpl,y then va bave tbua far. It i8 true that Scheler 1s not critical of Hasserl in the Formal.1S11l1lS 1tselt, but it 1s alao true that Scheler 1188 elsewbere ~ cr1t1cal of the ldeen. It 1s probable that had the ~ appeared earlier 1 Paul-Le Landsberg, "Husserl et l'1Üedé 1& pb1lOéopMe,* Revue In'ternatioDal.e .4!. Pbilosophie. l (15 Janvier 1939), 321. than 191' (the year in which Part l of the Forsaliama 1I'8S plbliBbed) the lo1'lll&l.ismus, vhich containa 80IIe of Scheler's mst important discussions of phenomenology and phenomeDOlogical lII8tbod ~ would baye made clear distinctions betveen the positions of Scheler and Hwsserl. In the Ideen there 1s DO existence outside consc1owmess. The fact that an object 1s given as real in consciowmess does DOt lead Husaerl to assert the actual reali ty of the objecte Reali ty does DOt belong to the essence of objects. The pheJlomenologioal reduct10n suspends aU questions of existence or reali ty. This po si tion 1s what ve ref'erred to earlier as "1dealism". Scheler,.!!!2. using a pheDOmenological anal.ys1s of' consc1ousness, rejected this 1dealiSll. In the Formalismus Scheler asserted that the very fact that the intentional objects cf our consc1ousnass are given to us as independ.ent of the subject 1s in 1tself sufficient evid.ence that the object cannot be conditioned by the subject.2 In bis subsequent lIOrks Scheler supplemented Husserl's eaphasis on the subjective aspect of givenoess vith sn ana.lys1s of objective data.' In connection vith this contrast between Husserl and Scheler ve mq note as an exaaple Scheler's rejection in the FormaliSllllls, Part II, of the notion that "the vorld" is an "id.ea". Maldng no mention of Hwsaerl Scheler asserts that the vorld is a concrete erlsting individual being and that the intention 1 See, for eXSllple, l'o1"'l811 S!II1S, n, A. ~ HafkesbriDk, "The Keaning of Objectivi8lll and Real.i8ll in Xax Scheler's Philosõ of Religion: A Contribution to the"lJnderétsnding of . 1fax Scheler' s Cath.olic Period,* Philosoph,y!S! PhenollEmOlodcal Research, II (1941-1942), 300. . . 'Ibid., 302. directed tovards i t does !!21 at an reduce to an idea 1d thout corresponding reality, ta a pure object of I18ntal life (pp. 404-4(5). Scheler, nnl1ke Russerl, never distinguished "eidetic reduction" (froll the particular to the universal essence) froa "pheDOJDI)nological reductionn (froll existence to pure phenomenal whatness). b resul t is that Scheler's I!vhattt , once free~ ~Il the nthat", is still neutral as regarda the distinction between Jliversal and particular.1 In accord vi th bis cri ticia of Hnsserl' s trend tcnrard idealiSll, Scheler vas particul.arly critical of the lack of clarification of the me~ of existence prior to its bracloeting in the phenomenological reduction.2 Scheler's discussion of affective perception, sent1menta, and affective states, vbich va vill be consid.ering in detail in the pages to fol.l.ov, is a model of Scheler' s use of the phenomenological method. 1Rerbert Spiegelberg, ~ PhenoJD9JlOlosical Movement: A" Historical Introduction, (2 vols., 2d ed.; The Hague: !Iartinus Nijhoff, 1965), I, 242. ~id., 245. Scheler rejects the tradit1oD81 division of the structure of spirit into "reason" and "sensibility" (p. 267). In the past an that was not of reason was attr1.buted to sensibility (p. 268). Rence emotioD81 lite vas necessarily reduced to the scheme of sensibili ty. Scheler asserts that modern philosophers, for the most part, also reduce all str1.ving, and aU love and hata, to seasibili ty. Intuition, af'tecti ve perception, str1.ving, love and hat9, aU those aspects of spirit outside logic, are made dependent on the psycho-physical orgaDic structure of man. As a resul t no one has aven asked it there cmmot exist among these non-logical aspects of our spirit orig:Lnal and essential hierarchic differences between the conceptual contents of acts and tunctions, it there 1s not to be found among these acts and f'unctions an "originalcharacter" analogous to that which belongs to the acts by which we grasp the objects connected by pure logic, and tbus whether there does not enst a pure intuition, a pure a:.ff'ective perception, a pure love and a pure oete, a pure str1.ving and a pure will, as independent of the psycho-pbysical organic structure of the hmIan race as 1s pure thought, yet ordered by an original. legali ty irreduc1ble to the rules of the empirical 8OUl.. Scheler concludes that the notion that there C8D. and mu.st be an absolute ethic vhich 1s at once .!. priori and ellOtional 35 bas baen hardly d.reamed ot batore nov (p. 268). ln Blaise Pascal' s "ordre du coeur" or "logique du coeur" Scheler tiDds a precursor ot his doctrine ot the elllOtional â priori. Scheler states that vhen Pascal vrote that "Le coeur a ses raisons", he understood 1t to mean that there 1s "an eternal and absolute legality ot aftective perception, love and hate, &8 absolute &8 the legality ot pure logic, but llhich c8llllOt be reduced to an intellectual legality" (p. 268). Scheler notes that other coDlllletatora have thought Pascal meant that "1dlen the reason haB spoken, the heart also bas 1ts say" (p. 269). But Scheler tbinkg Pascal meant in tact to say tbat "there 1s a mode ot experience whose objects are absolutely inaccessible to the understaDding, in tace ot vbich the understanding 1s as blind as the esrs and the hesring are in the tace ot colora, a mode ot experience tbat PIlts us authent1cal.ly in the presence ot objective objects and the eternal order that ties them ta one another, these objects baiDg the values and this eternal order the arlological bierarcby" (P. 269). Scheler adds that "the order and the lavs ot this experience are as determinate, emct, and discernable, as those ot logic and mathematics" (p. 269). This interpretation ot Pascal is in immediate accord with Scheler's notion ot the emotional â priori. and indeed 1s presented by vq ot introduction to Scheler's detailed discussion ot l'fDù.en and Getflhle. Simple aftective states {Gef'tlhl.smst!nde~ are distinct tram inten- . . tional "aftective perception ot sometbing" (F8b.len,!g!!, etvas) (p. 269). In i tselt this distinction prejudges nothing ot the a:r:iological content of the intent10nal sentiments (Getf!hl.e) (p. 269). It tells us nothing about the degree to which the intentional sentiments are appropriate organs for grasping values (p. ZTO). Original intentional a:ff'ective perception exists ("!!.~ ursprtlDgliches intentionales !'abl.en"). The instance, Scheler argues, vhich best shovs that th1s 18 the case is that in lI'hich sentiment and a:ff'ective perception co-exist, particul.arly' that in lI'hich the sentiment 1 tself 1s the intentional object of the affective pe~ption. An example of thi8 1s an a:ff'ective state (Gef'llhlszustand) of a clearly sensorial sort, such &s would correspond to the agreeable character of a meal. Neither the type llOr the mode of the affective perception of this affective sute 1s as ,.et detemi.ned. It is quite an opposite question for the variable states of tact whereby l "suf'fer f'rom this pain", l "submit to itn , or l "support it". What varies bere in the tanctional qua.l1V of affective perception 18 certainly not the state of pain. Nor 1 t 1s attention, UDderstood in the general sense of the term, vhereby l "take consc1ousness of", "remarkll , "cons1der", "observe" or "fom an 1dea of". .An observed pain 1s quite the opposite of a pain f'roa which one suf'fers. Moreover aU these foI'Dl8 and degrees of' attention and taJdng consc1ousness can theaselves, vithin each of the qualities of affective perception, UDdergo all possible variations vi thin the lim:i ts wbere the sentiaent remains i tself • !he thresholds of the affectively' perce1vable variations of the givenness of' pain are theref'ore coaplete17 distinct from the thresholds and relations of increase of' the state of' pain in relation to the irritation or cause of the pain. Aptitudes for sufferiDg and enjoyment are indepeDdent from seDSibill ty to sensorial pleasure and displeasure. In the presence of a pain of the same intellSity one individual mq suffer more or less thaD another. Affective states and affective perception are therefore flmd8Jlllllllntally distinct reali ties. !he former balong to the spbere of contents and phenomena, lI'hile the latter are f'unctions of grasping these contents and phenomena. Spec1fical.ly senaor1.al sentiments are by their very nature states. By the means of siIlple contents of sensations 'Eaptindens), representations (Vorstellens), or perceptions (Vahrnehmens), they C8n be "comected" vith objects (Objekten), but they can al80 be more or less objectless. Whenever such a connection 1s produead 1t 1s of a mediate nature. Vhen sentiaents are connected with the object 1t 1s alvays by relational acts superimposed on the givenness of the sentiment. If l as1t m;yselt what 1s the C&W!Ie of 'IllY' current disposition 1 t 1s at firet by completel1' different acts that this cause C8D be perce1ftd or remsmbaNd. It 1s õ after the fact and by a mental vision that l can reltlte the two. It 18 net true that the sentiment 1s here cormnected d.ur:Lng the peau to an objective reality (p. 270). In certain cases the sentiment ie tied to the object by the intervention of perception or representation of the objecte Certain affective states appear orig:l.n s1 ly tied to !!e. objecte In this case l IIII18t firet find the cause which has provoked th •• In ne case does the sentiment 1tselt refer to the objecte It contains no mental vision. It is not oriented towards something. '9 In other cases, vhere a sentiment is often found iD. conjunction vith exterior objects and situations or lIith lived experiences of alteration in my own body, i t can beeome an indice of this al teration. This 1s vhat happens, for example, vhen certain pains 8llDOunce to me the begl nn1ng of an illness because past experienee bas taught me that they 81"8 cormected 1fith the first signa of th1s illness. Yet again here the syabolic relation demanda first the .diation of the experience and the mental vision. The tie of affective perception, as intentional, vith that lI'hich 1s affectively perce1ved il'11t, however, 1s a cormection of a collpletely different sort. But 1 t 1s this part1eular cooeeetion that we find iD. all affective perception of values. Three different types of affective perception JllUSt be distingaished: 1) The affective perception of sentiments understood in the sense of states, and the modes of this affective perception, sueb as sufferiDg and joy-: Affective perception of sentiments can 1tself tend toward the zero point if we leave out of aeCOlUlt the changes that are produeed iD. the modes al though the affective state rema1ns the same. Strong emotions of dread often proTOke an almost total disappearance of the capaci ty for affective perception. In these cases the sensibility 'PapfiDdl.ichke1t) rema:iD.s intact in aU 1 ts aspects. 'fherefore there 1s DO reason in sueb cases DOt to admit that affective states exist. After the ~ intens1ty of sentiment bas faded ve can affeetively peree1ve the sentiment. 40 2) !he affective perception of e.otional. and atmospheric character: Ye find here qualitative eaotional. characters vhich can be also given as affective qualities, but wh1ch are noDetheless oever l1ved as trl!!le!ltiments", i.e., as referring to the l. 3) The affective perception of' values such as the agreeable, the beautifUl, and the good: lt ls õ hare tbat atfective perception exerci ses a cognitive :f'Imction, absent iD the first two cases, iD additlon to its iDtantional nature. From the beginn1ng affective perception bears a "relation of i tselt" and an "orientation of 1 tself" towarda an object, tovards values (p. Z71). This affective perception is not a b1"l1te stata, a simple stata of fact, capable of enteriDg iDto assoclative relations or of becoming a sign; lt is a !DOve_nt with a determinata goal, though lt ls not at all an activity of central origin nor a temporal.lJr extended lIOvement. lt ls a punctual movement, 80metimes d1rected by the l tovards the object, sometimes directed towards the l 1 tself, a moveDl6nt iD vhich something ls given to me and lB8ll:1.fests itself to lIS. Affective perception therefore bas the same relation to its arlologica1 correlate as "representation" bas to i ta "object", 1.e. an iDtentional relation. Here affective perception i8 not tied ~ wi tbout to the object whether iJlmediately or by representation, but news orig:inslly a particular kind of' objects, i.e. values. Affective perception la therefore an event having a sigDiflcation and i8 therefore al80 capable of COrr8spondiDg or DOt COrr8sponding to a content of real1sation. !his ls wby all "affective perception of 8OsethiDgI' ls iD pr1nciple equally a fom of "CO. prehension" , whereaa pure 41 affective states can be only established and explained by their causes. COl18ider the case of an emotional clash. An8er arises and develops in me. The tie between my anger and its object is clearly ne1ther intentional nor original. Representation, thought, or rather the objects given therein, srouse J1f3' anger and only then (though usual.ly rather quickly) do l relate the anger ta the objects, and always by means of representation. By tbis anger l do IlOt "grasp" anything. To the contrary, in order for tbis anger ta arise something bad must have already been grasped by me in an act of affective perception. Bu.t i t 1s a contrary situation vben l feel 80 and sa about 80mething or .2A ~ subject .2! something. Here the objects have not been grasped already, but they exist before me not as simply perceived, but as affected by value predicates IlOV being given in an affective perception. The analogica1 quali ties immanent ta the anologica1 structures in question themselves demand certain quallties of ell1Otional response react10n of the same type at the same time that they attain their goal in some way in these reactions. They coll8titute correlatiol18 of comprehel18ion and signification, special correlations, which are neither empirica1 nor contingent, and which do IlOt depend on the individual psychic causality of individuals. These correlations of significations between atiologica1 structure and ell1Otional response reactions belong, as presuppositions, ta all empirica1 comprehension (p. 270). If the demanda of the values do IlOt seem fulfilled, va suffer, as for example, when va are sad IlOt ta have succeeded in taJdng delight in an event to the degree ta vhich its aff'ect1vely perceived value merits, or IlOt ta have su.cceeded in 42 grieviDg as deeply, for exaaple, as a fatal accident to a person dear to us demands. !hese types of attitudes (vh1ch va call nei ther acta nor tlmctions) have in colIIIOn vi th intentional affective perception their orientation. But the,. do not contain in the proper sense a:rq intentional view, UDderstanding b,. th1s lived experience capable of mentally viewiDg an object and mek1ng appear, in doing 80, an objective reallty. F~r ,SUch is only the case for emotional lived experiences which constitute, in the DOst rigorous sense, affective pel'Ception of values. Bere ve do not have an atfecti ve pel'Ception "on the subjectif of 8OJllething, but a direct affective pel'Ceptive vin of something, a certain axiological quality. In this case, i.e. in the accoaplishment of affective pel'Ception, va are not objectivelyconscious of the perceiviDg atfectively-; vbat presents itselt to us, fram without or :!rom within, is onl,. an arlological quali ty. There IllUSt be a new refiective act in order that the Itperceiving aftectively" itselt be objectalised for us, and that ve thus be able to grasp reflexivel,. èi va "f8rceive-atf'ectively" attached to the objective value already given. This &tfective perceptive grasp of values va call the class of intentional flmctions. These functions have no need of the ediation of pretended "acts of objectivation" belonging ta represent&tion, judgement, etc., ta be tied to the objective scheme. This mediation is necessary onl,for the affective state, DOt for authentic intentional affective perception. When intentional affective perception is produced, it is the vorld of objects themselTes which "open" themselves to us, but 4' only' under i ta anological aspect. !he simple f'act that intentional affective perception 1a of'ten produced without a.n:y iIIIaged object sho1rs quite vell that it constitutes an "act of' objectivation" yhich needs no representative aediation. Moreover, if' one atudied (Scheler thinks this is DOt the place to do it) boy the natural perception and intuition we bave of the world are constru.cted, if' one studied the general lavs of the formation ot uni tiea of meaning in the language of children, the difterent ways the meanings in the major linguistic families are organized froJll which evolve the meanings of words and the syntax of diverse idiolBB, one yould Bee that it 1a the affective perceptive unities and the anological unities which play the directing and fund8mental role in all intuition ot the world expressiDg 1tself' in language (p. 273). Assureclly if one attributea the affective domain only to psychology one is lad in prlnciple to neglect these tacts. One therefore would never pay attention to tbat which, ~ affective perception, l:!l preference, .m love and in bats, opens itself to us f'rom the lIOrld and the axiological constitutents of this world; one would be concerned only ri. th ybat ve find in oursebea by intemal perception (i.e. by a representative attitude) ès WB perceive aff'ef>ti vely, ~ 119 pref'er, ~ 119 love and bate, .!À!!!. we enJoy a york of art, ~ we ~ to God. The emotional fu.nctions of lived experiences which are constru.cted only on "preference" and "subordination" JIIIlBt be distinguished f'roa those yhich consti tuts a superior stage of emotional and intentioD&l. lite and permi t us to grasp in these very funCtiODS the hierarcby of values, their 44 superiori ty 8Dd inf'eriori ty. "Preference" and. "subordination" are not at al.l striving activities llke, for example, choice which 1tself alwqs pr88U.pposes sntecedent acts of preference; they do not reduce to a purely affective perceptive attitude, but constitute a special class of lived experiences of emotional acts. The proof of th1s 1s that 118 can only "choose" in the strict sense betveen actions, wh11e va csn also "prefer" ODe good to snother. Preference attaches 1tselt immediately to affectively perce1ved aD.ological material, independent of the things tbat serve to support 1t, and does not presuppose, as doea cho1ce, representation of goals or even of~. To the contrary, 1 t 1s UDder the co-conditional action of preference that the goal contenta of stri viDg are fOrEd goal contents which themse1ves are not yet end contents, which alvays supposes a reflexion on the pre-existing goal contents and belollg only to this kind of striviDg activity which 1s the will. Therefore one sees that preference belongs only to the scheme ofaxiological knov1edge, lie! to that of atriving. In reality this cl.ass of lived experiences of preference consiste of intentional acta in the DIOst rigorous sense of the term, since they are "orien'ted" and "significant"; but to oppose them to the intentional flmctiol18 of affective pe~ept1on, 1re unite theII vith love and hate in the group of "eaotional acts'!. IQve and hate conati tute the superior 1eve! of our intentional ellOtional. lite. Rere 118 are far 81Iay trom the scbe_ of pure "states". ~ 1 tself marks this dif'ference of love from the reactiODS of response, for ODe does net say that one loves or hates "on the subject of somethiDg" or *of 8OaethiDg", but rather "80_tbi.pg". It 1s trae 45 that one frequently' hears 1t said that love and bate beloDg, vith anger, emsperation, and contrariety, to the "eaotiOIl8" or to the "affective states", but tbis error can be exp1a1ned only' by the ur.1.lateral point of' view of our era in regard to this question, which rests on a total lack of' pheDOlR8l.1Ological inquiry. One could bel1eve tbat love and bat. are themselves a preference or subordination, but they are DO such things. Preference presupposes at the very least the intentional. view of' a plurality of affectively' perce1ved values (p. 274). 'l'his 1s not the case for love and hate where 1 t can be that one is concerned vi th ~.2!!! value. Love and hate are a type of' "response-reaction" to the superior and iDf'erior being of aff'ectiVitly' perce1ved values sueh as ia given in preference. But 118 defiDe love and bate as "spontaDeous" acts &8 opposed to response-reactioll8 such as vengence. In love and hate our spirit does more than "respond" to values alre~ affectively' perce1ved. In love and hate it 18 rather a question of acts in vhich the UDiveree of' values, whatever it be, which 1s accessible to the affective perception of' a being (a UDiverse equally presupposed by pref'erence) gives vay to an experience of enlargement or contraction (and this naturally cOlllpletely independently' of the UDiverse of 800ds presently Sven, 1. 8. the real prec10us th1Dgs which are not even necessary f'or values to be perceived in their diversity, plentitude, and diff'erentiation). 'l'his enlargement and contraction does not at aU involve a creation or destruction of values by love and bate. Values can he neither created nor destroyed. They erlst independent of' aU organic structures beloDging to spiritual beiDgs. It does DOt be10ng by essence to the act of love ta orient 1 tself owing to a "response" tovards a VE,' ..e after 1 t bas perce1ved or preferred. Rather the act of love plays the ra1e of a detectar in our graspiDg 0'1 values. This 1s 1ts unique ro1e. I4ve consti tutes a movement oving to the deve10poeent of which new and superior values, i.e. as yet 1UJlmovn ta the being in question, are cl..ar1f1ed and 1lluminated. 1'herefore love does DOt reault tram affective perception of values and tram preference, but precedes thell as their guide. This 1s wby 1ts "creativeactivity does DOt manif'est 1tself at al1 in regard. ta values which exi,st by themse1ves, but in regard ta the circ1e and collection which consti tu'te an the values that a being can perce1ve and prefere Ethics will find 1ts completion in the discovery of the lava of love and hate themse1ves, in that which concerna the degree of their abso1ute character, their apriority and priaitiveness, their bearing on the lavs of preference and on the lavs of the relations of the axiological qualities ta which they correspond (p. 275). The precedi.ng pages present the definitive characteristics of the various fol"llS of affective perception (J'Uhlen). Ve lIUSt DOV examinA the ra1e lIhich affective perception, and particularly affective perception of value (Verttmù.en}, perfOl"ll in Sche1er's theory of non-formal value. Scheler asserts qui te early in his discussion that values express themse1ves in tbings of value, that value contents fiDd their content in phenomena (p. 34), that values thease1ves are real objective iDdependent entities (p. 37). It 1s then self-evident that if hmIIan beings 47 are ta be orieIl"oed in their choices and preferences by these objective values they lIIIlSt have SOIlle means of "knoviDg" these values. Yertfflhlen perf'orms this requisi te cogn1 ti ve tunction for Scheler. 1!lis siaply restates the eleaentary theBis on vbich Scheler's value theor,y rests. Ye JI11St concern ourselves as well vith the fine points of the function of Yertf8hlen. The values, which are the basis of stri.Ybg, are given to the person iaediately in affective perception (p. 57). It is thus possible to dellY that striVings are oriented by affective states, such as pleasure, for even in those cases where pleasure seema to conati tute the goal of striving (for ezample, striVings for particular kinds of food) the goal is not the pleasure itself, but rather the value of this pleasure (p. 57). A.ll values can be grasped, preferred, and subordinated inde pendent froll striving. Strivings can be oriented toward negative value. There is no guarantee by definition or any other JIleans that a striving 1s oriented necessarily to1f&l'd positive value. Illusions about value often arise s1mply because wa assume that lIhat 119 strive for must be of positive value (p. 58). :Ressentiment is a more complu fom ofaxiological illusion vhereby 1f8 transfol'll affectively perceived positive values, which ve are powarlesa to attain, into negative values (p. 59). Strivings and affective perception of values are hence ftmdsmentally independent. There is, howaver, an essential correlation whereby thel'8 corresponds to all values gLven in striving a possible grasp of these 88118 values in affective perception. A value gLven in str1'\'iDg and in arfective perception can be identical (P. 59). PreSWll8.bly the fact that the S8Il8 value, 48 ws grasped as positive byaffective perception, as vas given in striving, would assure both the absence of anologic.ü illusion (affective perception alone provides this assurance, striving alone does DOt) and that tbe striving vas itself good. Will bas the same axiological basis as striving though in villiDg a content is represented as SOll9thing to be real.1zed. The ends in their uiological respect are DOt thiDgs but values. The end of the willi ... determined by an act of choice which in turn rests on the value goals of striving. Thus choice is l1m1ted in the field of values open to it by' the values which are alreAAY the material of striviDg. A viU is "goodinsofar as it chooses the highest value 8Ilong those which belong to the goals of striving. The w1l1is oriented in this choice by' the lmowledge given it in the preferential set of the superior hierarchic chat-c:.~ter of the value content given in the striving (P. 6'). Affective perception bas a role in the second step, that of the orientation of the will by' the preferential set, for the latter is a cognitive function of VertffJh1en. It seems, hovever, that affective perception cmmot in 8.'Il'Y way extend. the field of values 8JIIODg which the viU chooses, for this field is determ:1ned õ by' the goals of striving. Though Scheler insista that ve can grasp values tovard which ft have DO striviJlg, and that our value UDiverse would be far poorer if' 118 could DOt, there aeeias to be DO wy whereby ve can v1ll that which bas DOt been a goal of striving or whereby' striving necessarily resets positively or negativel3' to .!!! the values grasped by Vertf'ahlen. This is on!y realistic hovever, for 49 no man, UDless his environment is unnatural.ly 1imi ted, desires or viUs in respect of each and every element of bis environment of which he bas at soma time judged the value. The moral value of an individual depends on the nature of the values offered to the will by strivings, on the level of these values in relation to the objective bieraI"Cby and hence on their richness and differentiation, and on the preferential order in which the strivings comply vith the will, for strivings, before they are presented to the vill, a1ready fom a bierarcby of preference in accord vith the objective bierarchy of values. The only instances where this hiera.rchy disappears or is disordered are those of perversions of striviDgs or i11nesses of the vill (P. 65). ! priori arlology bas two main elements: 1) knoll'ledge of values lI'bich is based on affective perception and preference, and 2) knoll'ledge of the essential value correlations, i.e. their superiority and inferiori ty. A being capable of only perception and thought but not of affective perception could have no ~ priori anology. It is on this ~ priori value knoll'ledge that moral vill and moral action is founded. Vithout this basis in affective perception a vill is blind or impalsive, but not moral. Self-givenness is the bighest degree of adequation (equivalent to absolute evidence). Values, however, can be given in affective perception in various degrees of adequation (p. 89). In the case where a value is self-given it is necessarily determining for the vill (thus Scheler qualifies the Socratic marlm lI'hereby knoll'ledge of the good determine"s the vill) (p. 88). 50 !he admission that affective perception ~ DOt give a value in lts tullest degree of adequation seems to qual.:it,y f'urther our earlier discussion of the necessary 1"01e o'l affective perception in relation to the will. !he will, though 1 t chooBes on the basis of kDOlI'ledge provided by affective perception, !Q.l!! prov1.ded vith inadequate knowledge and insofar as this ls the case chooBes "blindly" or on the bas1s of an mological ~llusion. !he f1eld of values vhich are affectively perce1 vable 1s limi ted by the acts of preference and subordination. This 1s the case because values present themselves in a hierarc~ and this hierarchy can be grasped ~ in preference and subordination, hence affect1 ve perception of value 1s founded on preference and subordination (pp. 109-110). This reflects the fact tbat Scheler regards values as essentially hierarch1cally related and as meaningf'ul as values only insofar as they are grasped as so related. Affective perception 1s s1gnif1cant for grasping the hierarc~ of values in relation to supports of value. Superior values are COEOnly affectively perce1ved as durable in their essence. The validity of durabill ty as a cri terion for original. superiori ty of value is problema.tic, but i t is a fact for example that men .e find that "ve DO longer love someone" va do Bot say "love 1s a fleeting thing" but rather "rq love 1I'&S an illusion". On the other band if a coJlllllUDi ty of interests ceasesto exist this is accepted as being in accord vith the essence of colllllUllities of interests. Love 1s a higher value than collllll1D1ties of interests (pp. 111-113). 51 Values are higher insotar as the;r are less divisible and. insotar as the)" unite rather than separate the individuals 1Iho grasp them in affective perception. A. material good DlUSt be divided to be aftectively percei ved sinee the value i t supports is of the sen.sorial order. Divine values are least divisible, IIOst unite individuals, and. at the same tille belong in pr1nc1ple ta an beinga. Scheler finds it problematic whether these criteria of extension and divisibility constitute the most original essences of the superior-inf'erior value distinction (pp. 113-114). In an cases whare one value is dependent on another, affective perception of the former occurs through that of the latter. The relations of d.ependency between values is theretore independent of all inductive exper1ance (pp. 114-116). The values given in immediate intuition as superior are the S8JII8 values which in aff'ective perception and preterence are given as closest ta absolute value (p. 118). Aftective perception and preference are therefore the means of grasping the original essence ot superior and inferior value. The criteria discussed above which Scheler regarded as problema.tic, 't:hou8h expressive ot essential correlations, are based on affective perception of the superiori ty' and inferiori ty of values and are therefore seconda.r;r. A more detailed discussion of the sarae issue is found in Scheler' s comments on the four modali ties of value. Bach modality', that of the agreeable and disagreeable, the vital, the spiritual, and the sacred, bas its 01ID particul.ar fora of affective perception, the :f'ImctioD of which in each case is to grasp the objective values corresponding ta that IIOdality (pp. 125-130). 52 A man's spiritual state rules hi.: beL. 'ior. In order to grasp his spiritual state ve need not look at Yhat he .92!!, for in fact this _y deceive us, as in the case of a man who acts in BUch a vay as to conceal his true spiritual. state. Spiritual states are graspable by' intuition and their value can be affectively perceived. Our notions of a man' s character and actions are corrected in terms of our lmovledge of the particular spiri tua! s'tate, hence ve are not dependent on observation of behavior alone in mek1ng judgements about other men (pp. 1341;9). Duty in the firet instance is DOt founded on immediate insight ot the good. Insofar as a value ia self-given as positive, Socrates' maD.a holds and va have no need to spaak of duty. In tact, duty is conceptual.ly in conflict vith an imIlediate grasp of value. Duty tends to be imposed precisely vhen our insight is il'ladequate or the persona! moral respons1b1lity 1s too heavy for us to bear (PP. 206-208). Bence duty ia that which affirma i tself as resisting an cri ticisa rather than that which is discerned as a positive good (p. 209). Thus i t is clear that the only role of affective perception of value in relation to duty is tbat of abolishing the need to speak of it, or of exeapting onaselt and perhaps ona's peers !rom the duties which one might be regarded as obliged to perform according to the universal maxiJa of a particular society. Thus it is affective perception which founds the moral autonomy of the individual. person (pp. 499-5(6). From the opposition of duty and imlDediate inBight ot values Scheler concludes tbat i t is erroneous to conclude that moral noms 5' correspond to the disposition of the people who posi t th8lll. The lack of a particular prescription may 1nd1cate e1ther that the people iD. question do DOt at an grasp 'x' as a self-given value in affective perception or that .!!! these people 80 grasp 1 t and hence there .1s DO need for a prescription regarding 1t. Henee the use of the enstence of the variety of moral noms to prove moral sceptie1S11l 1s false s1nce noms are not at aU the ul timate pr1m:1 tive elements of moral life (pp. 230-2'1). Each l1ved experience bears in 1tself an 1mmediately given intuitive nuance gi ven in the affective perception va have of i t. Thus the mental, i.e. all that csn be grasped by an act of interna! intuition, includes values (p. 214). Affective states C8ll deter us from affective perception. When our environment 1s given to us only as a source of stimulation for our affective states the environment 1s still pheoemenologically full of value. But in this instance the value quali ties of our affective states, rather than those of objects, are given and in illusion cm appear to belong to the th1ngs in our enviromaent. In the place of the values supported by things appear the value qual1ties of our cbang:lng affective states and the latter tend to bide from us more or less completely the former (p. 256). It 1s difficult to know whether what is neutral in value for us is in fact valueless or s1mply not affectively perceivable, st least for us. Lack of a value distinction in a l8Dgl1a89 does not necessarily imply that native speakers of this l.anguage are not consc1oUB of this distinction. Indefini te developaent of the capac1 ty for affective 54 perception of values seems possible for individuals and for the huJIan. species as a vhole. In fact, men are usual~ most clear~ conscious of the values vhich fulf'ill the requirements of their needs and instincts (PP. 280-281). Illusions* in evaluation often occur tbrougb. the contusion of objective value vith our interests. (p. 327). The viey Scheler seems te be supporting bere is that as a man' s needs develop his natural affective perception becomes more differentiated and developed. Active attention tends to be directed towards those goods and values of which one lIl8.Y' potentially be deprived or of vh1ch one is deprived in cëoepe.rison to others (P. 282). Variation in affective perception of values, and thus in the structure of value preference, of love and hate, is one of the fundamental causes of historical and Olltural ethical relativity (p. 312). Errors in analysis inevi tabll" occur if this variation is overlooked. Growth of a particular ethos occurs tbrougb. the discovery, bl" affective perception motivated by love, of values superior to those already grasped (PP. 318-319). Preferential 1"I1l.es are modified in the light of this discovery. Preferential 1"I1l.es betveen the old values remain intact, but are nov relatift to the nev~ discovered superior value (p. 319). Knowled.ge of levels of moral fomation can be gained through s'tudy of differences in the differentiation of affective perception and the graduation of approval and disapproval based on it (p. 319). lieeds are distinct !rom instincts, for the fomer are õ the product of civilization and are based on affective perception of value in the "needed" goods. lieeds are produced by habitual experience of non-primitive 55 goods. New production thus leacls to the develo:pnent of nev needs (p. 36'). In order turther to el.arify the role of Vertfflhlen in Scheler'a value theory, let us assume a s1 tnation in whieh Vertf'flhlen 1s totally' inoperative. In essence wbat we are doing 1s truncating the system in order to see vhat remains. Affective states, such as pleasure and pain, vould still exist. Such affective states could still be mediately related to their objects by' representation and perception •. Affective percoption of affective states and of atmospheric character would also still existe Strivings could no lOll89r be oriented by values and therefore vould probably bave affective states, such as pleasure, as their goals. V1 thout a:ny means of verif1cation the question of vhether a striTing vas oriented towards pos1 tive value would become simply tautologous. Cho1ces made by the will could not be made on the bas1s of imIIediate knowledge of superior and inferior value and thus vould probably be oriented to a maTi mi zation of pleasare or self-intere8t. Ve vould need completely new criteria for .. bat conati tuted a moral vill and moral action. There vould be no .!. Wri axiology. A man' 8 behavior lfOuld be our sole means of evaluatiDg his moralit,., i.e. the degree te vh1ch he possessed a moral ville Dut,. vould bã lost its main critic. !he nev view of dut,. vould depend on the notions of IIIDral viU and of moral action and the degree to which the potential clash between a social ethic and an individu&! ethic based on pleasure and self interest had been resolved. Such 18 the situation vith which one would be faced. It 1s one to vh1eh 118 should be quite accustomed. as 1t containe the essential elemen'ts of Neent ethical theories based on 56 interests. One must recognize, hovever, that 1t 1s far removed from the value theor,y envisioned by Scheler. CHAP'JER FOUR EVALUATION OF SCHEIER'S DOCTRINE OF VERTFfhnEN There are tbree fundamental problems which must be taloen up in the evaluation of Scheler's doctrine of Wertffthlen: the nature of value, the existence of Wertf'fthlen. and error and illusion in Vertffthlen. As in 8lJY epistellological relationship the basic elements of the object, the method by which the object is knollil, and the validit,y of the resultant knowledge, are intertvined. 'For the purposes of diseussion va will consider these problems in the order given above, referring back and forth as necessary. Scheler's notion of value as objective, irreducibIe, eternal, and. trans-human is controversial. There are nwaerous criticisms of, and altel"D8.tives to, this View of value which ma.st be considered. Without an object, that is, lI'ithout the existence of values, Vertff!hlen.would become superf'luous~ Insofar as Scheler's notion of value, or a close approximation thereof, is rejected, any discussion of Verttflhlen beco.s sheerly academic. If Scheler's notion of value i8 accepted one lIIUSt then consider whether or not VertffJhlen i8 indeed the means by which ve have access to value. On the other band, if his notion of value is rejected, the argument, thougb. weak, that those who do not grasp objective value in his sense have an undeveloped fora of Wertftlhlen, IIIlSt he considered. The problems of illusion and error are no Iess important 57 58 here than for any other form of knowledge. The attempt to found an ethic on Vertffthlen would be severely shaken by the lack of any cri terion of val1d1 ty. The questions bere are tvo-fold. On the one band ve will be concerned vith thE.t of the val1d1ty of VertfBhlen as such and on the other band wi th the validi ty of the phenomenologica1 analy'sis vhich Scheler uses to argue for the existence of Wertf'fth1en and objective value. 1. The Nature of Value Values, for Scheler, are independent of goods and ends, and 1rreducible to strivings or to affective states. They are l!. priori. objective, and can be grasped by WertftUùen, but not by reason or sensibility. Values are in no way dependent upon the psycho-pbysica1 structure of human beings.1 What we now wish to clarify' is the' sense in which Scheler regarded values as objective. Scheler often referred to values (includ.ing those of good and evil) as guali ties. "Therefore if one wishes to subsume an values under one category, tben one must denote them as qualities, but not as relations. ,,2 This choice of terminology is surprising st firet glance because it sppears to ru.n counter to Scbeler's insistance on the independence, the self-subsistence, of values. Scheler sa18 that values find their value content in phenomena only insofar as tbey 1Scheler,s notion of value is presented in greater detail in Chapter One, p. 7ft., to which the reader may vish to refer. 2"WeIID man also Verte ilberhaupt unter eine Kategorie subsumieren viII, so muss man sie aIs Qua11 tAten bezeichnen, nicht aber als Beziehungen." FormsliBDlllS, p. 257. 59 have things or persons as supports, though they remain quite distinct from these supports and carmot in any sense be explained by, or redueed to, these supports. In this sense values III8Y be ealled "qualities". This choiee of terminology by Scheler vas unfortunate, hovaver, and thougb he extends it in examples sueh as the one translated on page 7, vhere values are compared vi th colors, we ean only assume that he did 50 for laek of soma better metaphor. If the comparison is to be teken literally, as it bas been by many critics, ultimately it renders the notion of value only more complex and obscures, rather than clarifies, Scheler's notion of value. There remains the diffieul ty of the distinction between value as objective in itself, wbether in its inde pendent existence or as supported by an erlsting thing or person, and as objective as grasped by a subject in affective perception. Scheler is ever insistent that values are in no vay determined by the knowing subject. In tbis vay he rejects a.rry position allied vith subjectivisme Values continute to erlst aven when grasped by no men. It is this aame notion vbich allows Scheler to speak of man diseovering new values insofar as his affective perceptive eapacity develops. Values ~ tlms quite independent of man as knower, thoU8h man's affective life is relative to values. Scheler asserts that va tbink we live in a common universe of values, one vhich is common beeause it is objective, and va distinguish from it bath our subjective aptitude to grasp it and our degree of interest in i ts various elements (p. 190). Thus, Scheler adcls, lIhen va sa:y "This man is good" we mean to refer to an objective reality, 60 not the expression of our strivings (p. 190). fhus Scheler by no means excludes !rom discussion questions of the signif1cance of subjective elements in the relations of a human being to values and thiDgs of value, but at the same time he alvays insists on the objectivity of values and their hierarchy. The temptation to find s1m1larity between Scheler's notion of value and Plato's Foma must be set aside. Values, Scheler insists, belong no more to reason than they do to sensibili ty. Values are not ide&! objects. Thus neither their mode of existence nor of being knovn should be compared to such an object as the number :3 or the concept of a triangle. Values in fact belong originslly to ail degrees f)f being, Eai by comparison to the "good" in the sense of the !Y. realissimum. nor by participation in the "good" in a Platonic sense. (See pp. 100-183). A f'urther problem arises in regard. to whether Scheler intended to distinguish in a:rJ.Y essential manner between the mode of existence of a value in itself as independent, without any content in phenomena, and value as supported by things or persons. Affective perception is evidently not at ail limi ted to grasping value as supported by phenomena, for in Scheler' s discussion of love and hate i t is said that values can be perceived in their diversity, plenitude, and differentiation completely independently of things of value. Moreover, Bince love is spoken of as a guide for Verttflhlen rather than its result, as a movement leading to the discovery of heretofore llIIknovn values, such perception of independent values is evidently not dependent on a previous knowledge of these values as supported by phenomena. It thus appears 61 that there is no :fund.amental distinction between independent values and. values SIlpported by phenomena, in respect to their modes of existence, which is apparent to the affectively perceiving subject. This being the case, i t vould seem tbat phenomenologica1 analysis should not be expected te discover SIlch a distinction. Scheler used phenomenologica1 evidence te SIlpport bis claim tbat Wertf'fJh1en is not subjective. "Exactly' tbat is the phenomenological fact, tbat in the affective perception of a value the value itself is given as different from the affective perception of it in each individual case of an affective-perceptive :function and therefore the disappearance of an affective perception does not abolish the being of the value. n1 Scheler counters all attempts to reduce value te pleasure and. displeasure by arguing tbat such affective states in fact presuppose experience of value. nThe value givenness and the value distinction of the objects therefore in principle precedes the experience of the affective states, which these objects cause, and founds these states and their expiration.n2 Historical cha.nee in the preferential value structure, in the ethes of particular cultures, is also interpreted by Scheler as SIlpporting bis notion of value as independent and A priori. Variety in moral 1 "Eben das ist der phBnomenologische Tatbestand, dass 1m FUhlen eines Vertes er selbst von seinem F8hl.en als verschieden und. dies in jedem einzelnen Fall einer fthlenstunktion gegeben ist und darum das VerschviDden des F6hlens sein Sein nicht auf'hebt." Formalismns, p. 259. 2*Die YertgegebeDhei t und die Vertanterscheidung der Gegenst!nde geht also der Erf'abrung der Gef'ilhlszustAnde, welche diese GegenstAnde bev1rken, prinzipiell voraus und fandiert diese ZustAnde und ihren Ablauf' • n Formalismus. p. 261. 62 systems indicates that an adequate view of the universe of value and i ts hiera.rcb3' is attainable .2!!!z if one considera .!!! these systems and their historical developoent. The totality of the realm. of value can never be given to a single person, people, nation, or epoch. Not evidence for scepticism, but a reaffirmation of the notion of value as objective, independent, and A priori, is thus what Scheler finds in the phenomenon of diversity of ethos. The notion that men create values is excluded !rom the Schelerian schema. Scheler does, however, recognize the existence of development of nev supports for value and the development of the huma.n capaci ty for affective perception. The values them.selves, being independent from both their supports and from the knowledge vhich men JJJB:1 have of them, cannot be said to be either created or destroyed by men. Values and the value bierarchy were evidently conceived of by Scheler as absolute. Rad they not been absolute, they would have been relative to something, and this is an alternative for which Scheler nei ther provides in any clear vay in the FormaliBmllS, nor evidently intended to do. In the Forevord to the 3rd edition he notes that bis ethical position remains the same, and in particu.lar tbat it bas not been affecteoe by al terations in his religious and metaphysical positions since i t vas not at ail founded on metaphysical principles. Ve do not intend to take up the issue here of vhether this independenee is strict, and, if it vere not, wbat the implications for his value theory would be. Such questions may be considered. seriously only by those who have studied in detail his later writings, soma of wbich have yet to be published. Scheler' s notion of value as absolute ean be further clarified. The term 'absolute' is not used here in a:ny Platonic sense. Sensible and. vital values are regarded as relative, though net in the sense of subjectivity, to beings which have sensibility and are alive. These values would not exist if there vere no sensible living beings and. are therefore .BQ! absolute values. Absolute values are those values which are not relative to sensibility and life, that is, moral, spritual, and sacred values. The absoluteness of a value is given immediately, and. acts of comparison, induction, and. judgement do not serve as evidence for it (p. 119). Values are higher insofar as they are less relative to an absolute value. A second kind of relativity is that between values and. goods and is known, not immediately, but through reason, while the third. form of relativity is that betW'een goods and things. The precise IIB.ture of value in Scheler' s sense remains problematic. From a phenomenologieal point of view it can be said, as Scheler did, that values are the intentional eorrelates of Wertffthlen. Thua, assuming that phenomenologiea1 analysis is aecepted, and. that Wertfmllen is thougbt to exist, certain observations can be made about the relationships of values to one another and. to things of value and. persons. Attempts to compare the mode of existence of values in themselves to modes of existence diseussed in the trad! tional terme of rational philosophy ean be set aside by declaring that values are unique in this respect. Where diffieul ty is encountered, however, is where Scheler seems to have ventured beyond the bounds of phenomenologiea1 a.nal.ysis. That is, if 64 119 are ta regard values as open to us as human beings only as intentional correlates of WertfBhlen, hov can va regard as anything more tban speculation statements to the effect that values are 1mmu.table, and that SOE values are absolute in the sense that they are not dependent on the existence of sensible living beings for existence? It is one matter to assert that values are objective and independent on the basis of the phenomenological fact that a value as grasped by affective perception is given as distinct from that act of affective perception (p. 259). It is quite a different matter to assert that values are imlmtable, for tbis could only be known by an eternal beiDg who continually grasped aU values in affective perception. This is therefore one instance in vhich Scheler seelDS to have gone beyond the bounds of pb.enomenological evidence. Scheler distinguished, as 1re have noted, absolute and. relative values as those vhich vere not and vere dependent, respectivelJ', on the existence of sensible liviD8s beings for their 01fD existence. It is reasonable to say, as Scheler does, tbat sensible and vi ta! values vould not exist if there were no sensible living beings. It is, however, difficul t to comprehend, in the absence of the postulation of a God or even a spirit of the UJJiverse, hov moral, spiritual, and. sacred values are not dependent for existence on the existence of at least !m!!!. lmJIan beings. Moreover, insofar as his claim that some values are absolute does depend on the postulation of a Gad i t cannot be said to rest on phenomenological evidence. If phenomenology is to attempt ta build a metaphysic surelJ' i t must limi t the scape of that metaphysic to discussion 65 of phenomena which are in fact open to phenomenological experience. The questions of the nature of phenomenological evidence and self givenness, fundamental for a proper evaluation of Scheler's arguments for the nature of value, vill be taken up in the third section of this chapter. Ve find i t possible to agree vi th Scheler that subjective theories which attempt to ground value solely in satisfaction or some other psychological state are incorrect, for such paychological states presuppose values and grounds of values which are objective. Similarly interest cannot be said to bestow value on its object, but only the condition of being regarded !:!!. valuable which is quite a different matter. When we say "x is good" we mean that it is worthy of approval, not simply that va approve of it. A parallel is found in the case of facts which are known about the physical world. My coming to know a fact does not create the fact which existed previous to my knowledge of it. If we take tmy given situation, then, va must say that it is made up of a multitude of facts -physica1 facts and value facts. A description of this situation by any particular individual might well be somewhat different from that given by any other individua.l ~ regard ~ ~ the physica1 facts and the value facts. A simple example of this in regard to physica1 facts is found in descriptions of Gestalt diagrams. Similarly, presented vith other pictures or situations two individuals often note different elements and emphasize different relationshipa when asked to comment. Disparity in descriptions of value facts should therefore not be taken as proof of the non-objectivity or subjectivity 66 of value facts, but rather as confirmation of the fact tbat different individuals have distinct perspectives, concerna, interests, and desires, which tend to maloe them avare 2!. the value facts which correspond to these distinct perspectives, concerna, etc. From what we have said it follows that ve are willing to regard. the value of a thing, persan, or event, its being valuable, as a I!sll., quite inde pendent from our knowledge of it. Thus we can agree vith Scheler that value is objective. The question of the nature of the tie betveen the value and that of which it is a value is a distinct issue. The example which 1llustrates the problem best is that of the thing regarded as "good in 1 tself" since this avoids consideration of long chains of means and ends. The term 'quality' was used by Scheler to denote this relationship of the value to the support of value. Ve have suggested that 'quality' vas a poorly chosen term. The problem, hovever, is whether, in this ultimate instance of that which 1s "good in 1tself" ve can accept Scheler's insistence that the value could in no vay be reduced to, or equated vith a:rry physiC!Ù attributes, sinee this confounds value vi th supports of value and necessaril.y leads to errors in analys1s. In connection w1 th this contention Scheler made an apt remark when he said that DIBllY values are conceptually indefinable (P. 36). When one takes into account the difficulty which value theory bas had in isolating in discursive formulas what 1t is that maltes sometbing "good in itself" one 1s inclined to accept Scheler's point. However, just as without sensation it vould be impossible to experience sensible objects and to 67 speak of the pbysical configurations which serve as objects for sensation, so without some means of experiencing values it should be impossible to speak of values. Thus, ultimately, if we are to reject the view that values are reducible to physical attributes of their su.~ ports and yet still continue to talk of values, some sort of cognitive f\mction lJDlSt be capable of grasping values. If values are not reducible to physical attributes this particular cognitive function cannot be attributed to sensation, and while reason could provide evidence that something must be good because i t is the means to some desirable end, reason can hardl.y be said to have original ]1' the capaci ty for grasping that end as desirable. This line of argument leads directly to the notion that there must be some other means of grasping value, and of course, for Scheler this other means vas Yertf'Ohlen. 2. The Existence of Wertft!hlen The whole notion of cognitive emotion bas been rejected by soma authors. Rudolf Allers asserted that all modern psychologists regard cognitive emotions as "reactive and subjective states".1 Ernst von Aster asserted tbat most men have no intuition of value and that those who claim to have that capaci ty are in fact disguising from themselves the influence of their prior attitudes towards, and experience of, the objects whose value they claim to intuit.2 European psycbology, however, 1 Rudolf Allers, "The Cognitive Aspect of the Emotions", ~ Thomist, IV (1942), 621. ~rnest von Aster, "Zur Kritik der materialen Yertethik", Kantstudien, XXXIII (1930), 175-176, 68 bas been iDf'luenced by Scheler' s theory of emotional levels which ls f based on the notions of emotional intentionali ty and objectivity. It la our thesis that It ls necessary to admit .!! least the distinction between :teeJ.in8s lI'hich are subjective states and feelings which are intentional. Sensations ara widel,. held to have objective reference, vhile feelings are thought to be subjective. In the strict sense, however, objective reference can he attributed only to some sensations. Likewise not all feelings have a purel,. subjective origin. The assumption that sensation ls a ~ reliable sout'Ce of data about the objective vorld than ls feeling may be a rash one. The question ie rendered more complex .hen va attempt to differentiate the feeling and sensation aspects of a given experience.2 Inability to distinguish clearly between sensation and feeling should lead either to regarding sensations to he as unreliable as feelings for cognition of the objective vorld or to a re-evaluation of the supposed subjectivi ty of ail feelings. The notion of immediacy is of significance in evaluating the objective and subjective aspects of any e:z:perience. Objecte and nents as the,. are experienced as given to us as phenomena are the products of colllplex Chains of physlca1 and psychic events. Thus in one sense they are higbly mediated, though the,. strike our conacloUBness as immediate 1 Stephan Strasser, ItPhenomenological Trends in European Psychologr", Philosophy ~ Phenomenologica1 Research, XVIII (1957-1958), 18-34. ~les of various po si tions which have been held on this question are given by Charles Wa.llru:ff in Philosophica1 Theory !!!à Psychologica1 .!!.2!: A!! Attempt â! Smthesis, Tucson: University of Arizona, 1961, p. 28. 69 and it is only through yet further analysis tbat we become aware of their cC::l.ponent elements: brain events, pure sensations, prior assum.~ tions, etc. If.we assume tbat tro.l.y immediate experience cannat be in error, for error arises only through the processes of judgement, inference, and reason, then feeling must be regarded as a cognitive faculty which is as rel1able as is sensation in those instances where feeling can be shawn ta be immediate. It is, however, difficu1t if not impossible ta demonstrate conclusively that any of the sensations or feelings, vith which we are concerned at the level of experience of the phenomenal object, are 1mmediate. It is only in analysis of the e:xperience of the phenomenal object that we can begin ta identify points of unconscious mediation. The lines of argument which are folloved concerning the nature of the various cognitive facul ties strongly mirror the view which is held of the world and ~-versa. Just as we suggested in the lãt section that the view tbat values vere objective and inde pendent of the pbysical attributes of their supporting objects implied that Vertftlhlen or somathing analogous existed, so bere if sensation is regarded as a f'acu1ty of grasping the objective world it must be assumed that objects or qualities of objectS< exist corresponding to sensible experience. L:iloewise, if feeling is to be regarded as a cognitive facu1ty of this same order, objects or qualities of objects which correspond to the experience grasped by feeling must existe The real issue arises then in the question of whether feeling does in the end bave a claim to immediacy, whether feeling has a direct cognitive relation to the objective world. It could be argued that feeling bas a 70 cognitive function which is purely within the subject. Thus, for eX8JIlple, one would not say that one could grasp the goodness of an object in that object i tself as i t is in the world but rather as one re:presented that object to oneself. The "imIIlediacy" of feeling would thus not be between the subject and the object, but between the subject and the phenomenal object, and the object available to feeling would tbus a.l.ready have been mediated by the processes of sensation and perception.. Feeling could provide new experience of the object only insofar as it interpreted the phenomenal. object. A facul1;y of feeling of this sort would be in a po si tion in relation to the external object similar to that of reason. There seem to us to be two possible ways in which feeling can be related to objective value. The first is that whereby feeling grasps objective value immediately as i t is in the external lfOrld. The second. vay feeling may be related to objective value is that in which feeling does not grasp objective value immediately in the external world, but rather as supported by the object as i t is represented to the self by sensation and perception, that is, as supported by the phenomenal. object. If' va want to maintain that there is objective value which can be grasped by feeling, then one of these two poSSible ways of stating the relationship between feeling and objective value should, upon 8xsminaUOD, show itself to be theoretically superior. The phenomenal object as given is structured by selection, attention, simplification, the frames of reference, etc., which va bring to our 71 experience. Our phenomenal experience is higb.ly mediated. This does !!2!., however, imply that phenomenal objects exclud.e representation of objects of the external 'ifOrld as contB.1n1ng a:ml~porting value. Renee the second possibUi ty is not rejected on this basis. A more serious objection to the second possibility lies in the viey that Bince value is an original primitive quality, i.e. not reducible ta a:rry physical attributes, value cannot enst in the phenomeoeJ. object unless the latter is based on value feeling.!!!. ~..!!!. sensation. Sensation can grasp only physical attributes of objects, vhile value is nei ther a physical attribute nor does i t consiet in any relation of physical attributes. This difficul ty can be dissolved if i t is possible ta maintain that value, an original primitive quality, is supported by the physical object as a whole and hence as long as the phenomenal object 1s truly representative of the essence of the object there is nothing to prevent tb1s phenomenal object from serving the same 1'01e as a support of value. Yi tb1n the framework of the more detailed picture of the relation of feeling and objective value, which we have provided, a clearer viev of value feeling abould emerge. Value feeling within the fr8Dl81fOrks of the firet and second possible relations seems to be essent1al.ly the same save as to the place of i ts object, vb1ch is external in the first case and internal in the second. This difference is hi~ s1gn1t1cañ, hovever, for in the seccnd case, vhere the object is internal, there 1s DO need for "feel.ing'-Organs" to perform a function paralle1 to that performed by sense-organs. In the second, where feeling grasps value 72 supported by the phenomenal object, the whole process of value feeling is internaI to the subject. Value feeling, in ~ respect, is similar to reason, but it is still quite distinct from resson in other respects. Resson deals vith comparisons and differentiations of that vh1ch is already given. Reason ean compare the values of x and y once these are given, but va still have not clarified 2 it is that values are given. Even though va have elimjnated the first possible relation of feeling and value and vi th i t the problem of "feeling-organs", va still must provide a means for value to be grasped if it is a primitive element, objective, etc., as we have mainta.ined. It is necessary to admit the existence of a faculty of value feeling vbich has an original cognitive capaci ty. There is no other vay to explain the processes of human valuation vi thin ~ framework. Ve note in passing that the theory whereby value is grasped in the phenomenal object allows an additional opportun1ty for error. Insofar as the phenomenal object is not a true representation of the external object, different values may be supported by the phenomenal and external objects. ~s error may enter here ~ though one ma1ntains that value feeling grasps the value of the phenomenal object immediately, i.e. infallibly. There is a strong affini ty between the po si tion va set forth above and the fundamental assumption of Brentano according to which "notbing C8ll be judged, nor can anything be desired, nothing C8ll be hoped for or f'eared, if i t is not represented". 1 Brentano maintained 1 . "Nichts kann beurteilt, nichts kann aber auch begehrt, nichts kann the priority of representation among all mental acts, and this ls essential.ly what ve have reasserted above in opposition to Scheler. At the same tilDe, however, the role vh1ch va have alloved reason and affectivity in influencing the content of representations, or phenomenal objects, is far greater than tbat given to them by Brentano. Vhat va must cl.ar1fy first, is the degree to vh1cb. our position diverges from tbat of Scheler, and second, what repercussions this divergence bas for Scb.Gler's value theory. It must be remembered that Wertflllilen, in Scheler 1 s view, can grasp ei ther value as supported by goods, that is, as it finds 1ts content in phenomeoe, or value apart from phenomena. Cur pos1tion does not exclude the latter as 1t is as yet concerned only vi th the former. Scheler states that affective perception (Ffthlen) bas the same relation to 1 ts axiological correlate as "representat1on" bas to 1 ts "object", i.e. an intentional relation (p. Z72). In this statement there 1s nothing to preclude Wertf'f!hlen !rom having as i ts object value as supported by the phenomenal objecte Bor does Scheler's statement, that affective perception 18 not tied !.!:2!! vithout to the object e1 ther 1mmediately or by representation, but vievs origf nal ly a particular kind of objects, 1.e. values (p. Z72), at aU clash vith our viev that the object of value feeling, 1s not the supporting good or person, but rather the value vbich 1s supported by the phenomena! objecte gehofft oder ge:f'llrchtet verden, 1I9Dn es nicht vorgestellt vird." PVES, p. 104. 74 In Scheler's assertion that Vertfnhlen does not require the mediation of "acts of objectivation", belonging te judgement, representation, etc., te be tied te the objective scheme (p. 273), there is still no disagreement vi th our viey as long as va keep in mind that the values supported by phen.:;.aenal objects are as "objective" as values supported by external objects. Ve JIII1St disagree vi th Scheler, however, vhen he asserts that intentional affective perception is clearly show te constitute an "act of objectivation", which needs no representative med1ation, by the "simple fact" of its often being produced vithout a:tJy imaged object (p. 273). How strongly va disagree depends on the interpretation va take of what he intends te sa:y by this statement. If he means, as ve think he did, that it is possible te grasp the value g! something without having that thing as a phenomenal object, then 1re JIIIlSt disagree. If he vas instead spaaking of value grasped qui te apart !rom consideration of a:tJy possible support for that value then va have no quarrel vi th him .m ~ moment for this is not the issue vi th vhich ve have been concerned. There are problems, however, vith the notion set forth by Scheler vhereby Vertf'f.!hlen can grasp indepandent values, values unsupported by &.Dy phenomena. Ve cannot accept this viey fC'r i t requires that Vertf'Bhlen not be depandent in i ts operation on the presence of a phenomenal object within the consciousness of the individual. Any fom of Yertf'Bhlen vhich functioned. in the affective perception of indepandent value in the manner eDVisioned by Scheler vould necessarily be capable of performing the function of "feeling-organs". Bot only are ve sceptical about the abi1i ty of Wertf'fthlen te tuDction in this V8'3, but va alse can f1nd no 75 case in our ovn experience vhere va C8ll say tbat va have grasped values indepeDdent of Al! phenomenal supports, of Al! images, and of .!!! representations, authentic or illusory. It 1s, of course, inadequate to argue that because .2!!!!. persan dof"s not experience some object, ~.QB!. is capable of experiencing that object. Scheler probably vould have suggested tbat the affective perceptive capaci ty of a person who ditl not grasp independent value vas lim1 ted. 'flle fact that people talle about goodness, beauty, love, hate, etc., seems to support Scheler's viey that men C8ll indeed grasp indepeDdent value. It 1s, however, far more 1ikely that the object in these cases 1s not an. indepeDdent, objective value, but rather a subjective abstraction based on the noIe of the speakers previous experience. As such 1 t 1s not an. abstraction limited to discursive rational categories, but may be based as vell on affective and sensory experience. The teDdency to assume that an. iDdependent objective value exists wh1ch corresponds to tl::ds subjective abstraction 1s understandable, though misguided. Not only bas Scheler failed to demonstrate that indepeDdent objective value must enst, but he bas also failed to explain satisfactorily hov men vould be capable of grasping values of th1s type. As regards the case of the discovery of "nev" values, nev in the sense that they are nev to us, unsupported by phenomenal objeots, ve vould say in opposition to Scheler that we discover these values only throU8h extrapolation from our previous experience of values. Thua, in the very pro cess of coming to "grasp" them, ve necessarily provide them vith supporting images 8l4d representations. It is in such extrapolation 76 tbat men are closest to being creators of value. In tbis process men are not dependent on the actual existence of external objects wbich support these new values or on their own capacity to affectively peroeive value as supported by a phenomenal representation of an external objecte This process of extrapolation, however, can never create objective values. Somevhat ironically, our discovery of nev values a1so cu be based on erroneous representations of external objects. Discovezoy of such misrepresentations may lead us to realize tbat the external object in fact supports a different value than tbat vhich va had originally assumed, but i t does not destroy the fact of our having.)xperienoed the nev value supported by the phenomenal objecte The main indication that the position va have taken does in fact diverge from Scheler's, and that he would be critica1 of it, is found in ms assertion tbat by attributing the affective domain only to psychology one is concerned only vi th vhat va find in ourselves by internal perception (i.e. by a representative attitude) ~ va perceive affectively, ~ ve prefer, ~ va love and hate, ~ we enjoy a YOrk of art, ~ va pray to God, and not vith that which.!!! affective perception, !B. preference, ~ love and hate, opens itself to us from the world and the axiological constituants of this world (p. 274). Ve have not, hovever, attributed the affective doma1n ~ to psychology. Rather our position lies betveen this one and the one Scheler supported whereby intentional affective perception often is pl'Oduced vitbout any ;mag;fDed objecte Scheler' s position and the one vhich va support do not bave different implications for the fonction vhich VerttfJh.len vould serve in value theory 77 in respect to values wh1ch find their content in phenomena, i.e. values supported ~ phenomena, save in respect to the ways in which error and illusion arise. Our position does differ !rom Scheler's in regard to the grasping of values unsupported ~ phenomena. In practice, ho1l9ver, the implications of this difference would not be radical.ly diverse, for wh1le Scheler cla1ms that Wertf'Ohlen can only grasp new values wh1ch are relativel1' immediate in their superiori ty or inferiori ty to values previously knovn, ve have cla1med that discovery of new values occurs onl1' through. extrapolation from our previous experience of values. The range and diversity of values vhich can become objects for Vertf8hl.en, according to the two schemes, thus vould not differ significantly • 3. The Problems of Error and Illusion Scheler mainta1ned that the rigour of phenomenology is founded on 1ts return J:s? ~ facts. An ethic based on this method 1s therefore regarded as being founded, not on arbi~;rary constructions, but on facts. The facts vith vh1ch phenomenology 1s concerned are essences and essential correlations rather than empirieal and contingent facts. These .!; priori tacts can be ne1 ther observed nor defined. Since their content is trul.y fundamental and 1rreduc1ble i t can only be revealed. Scheler maintained that experience of essences corresponds more closel1' to the idea of experience than does sensible experience. The first is pure and iDlRediate experience, whereas the second 1s conditioned, and therefore med1ated, b1' a natural organic structure. 78 In the essentia! conati tuents gi ven in phenomenological experience the ontologica! and ab80lute consti tuents of the world are revealed and the difference betveen the thiDg in 1 tself and the phenomenon dissolves. Phenomenology, according to Scheler, "gi ves a pure knowledge, vi thout presuppos1tiona.1 Moreover, since phenooeenology gives the absolute facts themselves 1t coinc1des prec1sely vith metapbysics. At the saoee t1me Scheler asserts that phenomenology represents emp:l.r1c1sm and pos1tivism in their moat radical forma, because 1t e.dm1ts nothiDg save 2 experience • Inductive knowledge 1s only probable, while phenomenological intuitions have an intrinsic evidence which defends them against aU attacks. Though phenomenological intuitions are not reduc1ble to inductive knowledge they still are e:r:perienced and therefore are .!. posteriori. though they may be concerned vith that which 1s.!. priori. The.!. priori is given as the content of an intuition, 1t 1s not constructed by thought, it 1s not the resu.lt of a subjective elaboration and organization of experience. Sche.ier rejected the Kantian view vhereby the .!. priori vas an orderillg structure imposed by reason on experience. The.!. priori. according to Scheler' s schema, 1s in the th.1ngs (Sachen) themselves. It 1s the rea! iDlD!8nent structure. 1Ka:r: Scheler, ~ Ethik E!à Erkenntnislehre, ed. Haria Scheler, 2nd. ed., in Schr1ften sus dam Hachlass. Eand l, in GeS8Jlllelte Werka, (:Berne: Franke), X U957'),P:-419. Hereafter c1ted as ~ Ethik. 2zur Ethik. p. ~1. 79 It is vi thin such a viey of the nature and scope of phenomenology that the question of phenomenological evidence, and therefore the problems of error and illusion, arises. The being given of an object of phenomenological intuition is distinct fram tbat of sensible and conceptual avareness. The sensible given is contingent and relative to the subject. In addition, the senses only represent the object. Conceptual thought bas only an indirect relation vi th i ts object. But in phenomenological experience the essence is directly present to the consciousness vi thout intervening symbols and signa. Phanomenology is a continual "de-symbolization" of the yorld.1 In phenomenological experience nothing is intended which is not given, and nothing is given which is not intended. Any case mere the given exceeds the intended, or the intended is not given "in person", is not a.l!!!!. phenomenological experience. The phenomenon manifests i tself exactly in this coincidence of the intended sncf the given. No phenomenon is without evidence which is found in the consti tution of the phenomenon. For Scheler evidence consists of an objective state of a thing of value, in respect of its Sosein, being present to the subject "in person" by virtue of being the correlate of an intentional act, in such a Vay tbat a complete uni ty of coincidence is realized betW'een the conat! tuents of all the acts of thought and intuition which i t is possible to have regarding the object. 1 Ë Ethik, p. 384. • • Scheler 1s convinced that close familiar:lty with the facts must precede questions of criteria. Thus he asserts that the question of cri teria 1s posed by the one who 1s eternal.ly "other", who does not vish to find the tru.e and the false or the good and. the bad. in li ved experience, but vbo places himself outs1de an these like a judge.1 Each domain haB an intrins1c truth, which 1s not establisb.ed by the application of princ1ples originating elsewhere, but 1s constituted instead by the phenomena themselves. Those who are preoccupied by questions of criteria are reminded that criteria are never primary, that criteria a1ways derive in the end from soma contact with things. One vants to insist that if there i6 no criterion for self-givenness there can be no certainty based on phenomenologica1 intuitions. But Scheler responds by ins1sting that the very idea of a cri terion of self-givenness is absurd., sinee a1l questions relative to criteria make sense only when the thing (Sache) is not given "in person" and 2 is only represented by a "symbol". Truth, in the case of a phenomenologica1 intuition, indicates that the object 1s as 1 t appears to be, as i t i8 represented, vhile tru.th, in the case of a judgement, according to Scheler, indicates a coincidence of the judgement vith the state of the thing as 1t !$ intent1onally, not' as 1 t is !!1 i tself • Truth, or authentici ty, in the case of the phenomenologica1 intuition, is opposed, not to the false, the erroneous, but to the apparent, the illusory. Illusion 1Zur Ethik, p. 382. 2zur Ethik, p. 382. 81 alYsys resides in the 'Vay in which the states of the thing attain the rank of the gi ven. 1 Illusions arise from the pre-Iogical sphere of consciousness, and i t is therefore impossible to reduee illusions to errors of judgement end reason. It is impossible to escape illusion by overcoming error. To overcome illusion one must attain a ney re18tionship with the tbings themselves. The truth of intuitive evidence is 2 the foundation of aU other forms of truth. Illusory objects, such as those found in hallucinations, can be made the subjects of true judgements. Precision of judgement would, however, appear pointless, vhen one attellpted to dine upon an illusory banquet, even after correctly classify1ng the range of colora, odora, and shapes found in that banquet. Illusions are characterized by something being taken as gi ven vh1ch in fact is not there. The distinction of true and false belonging to the spheres of judgement and inference does not pertain to illusion at aU. An illusion may seem to be as fully given as a pure intuition. If one sees a vax figure and mistakes i t for a huma.n being one may well have grasped aU the characteristics of the vax figure. The mistake entera in taking these characteristics to be those of a human being rather than of a vax figure. This is a case of error in judgement, rather than an illusion. Sense illusions and perceptual illusions are distinct. The phenomenon of the bent stick is a sense illusion, ainee the viswù. object ia actually bent though the stick itself is not bent. It is vhen dif'ferent 1 ~ Ethik, p. 409. 2zur Ethik, p. 409. 82 senses concor in presenting the impressions one vould expect !rom the supposedly rea! illu80ry object that a rea! perceptual 1llusion bas occurred. Judgements about the content of illus10ns are false if taken as referring to reality, but may be true if taken as referrl"'g to the illusion. Error occors only subsequent to the existence of certain actual mstters of fact and beliefs about those actual matters of fact. Scheler admi ts qui te readily tbat there can be illus10ns of evidence: a subject can believe he bas an intuition where there 1s none, he can think he bas gr&sped a tru.& essence when in fact 1 t is merely a subjective phenomenon.1 The only recourse for Scheler, who rejected the notion of a criterion of seli*g:i.venness as absurd, vas to purif'y the evidence and ascertain that nothing exterior would intervene in the givenness of the objecte The historical situation, preferences, heredity, etc., of the subject could. be suspended. Tva persons, however, stillllligbt not grasp the same evidence or not §!!!!!!. to grasp the same evidence. This is sometimes due to the difficulty of communicating an intuition. Phenomenological essences cannot be def'ined or conceptualized, but only sean. Descriptions and arguments often taloe a negative fom whereby aspects are elimiD8ted until nothing rema1ns save the phenomenon i tself. 2 Discord 1s not suff1cient to make an intuition suspect since it can alwsys be attributed to difficulties of collllllUDi.cation. 1 ~ Ethik, p. 393. 2zur Ethik, p. 392. There are objective essences vhich are accessible only to one person, one culture, or one historical era. There are trnths vhich hold for only one individual just as there are goods vhose value is manifest only to an individual consciousness.1 &ch person must maintain his position, understsnd'ing at the same time that evidence vhich escapes him constitutes tmths and values for others vhich are no less objective and absolute.2 Scheler did not believe that the principle of phenomenological evidence, as he understood it, vas at aU weakened by the exiatence of illusions of intuition or by the impossibili ty of lII8ny intuitions being universally recognized as such. Though there are ~ ways in vhich errors can intervene in a value theor,y, in the case of Scheler' a value theor,y we have not only the possibili ty of errora of judgement but also the possibili t;r of illusor,y intuitions. Intuition ia at the sa.me time the most f'wldamental type of experience and source of knowledge vi thin thia scheme. For this reason we will be primari.l.y concerned ri th the question of illusory intuitions, though this by no mans implies that error is a problem of little significance. Scheler's notion of self-givenness lies at the core of our problem. He rejected, as va noted above, sny attelllpt to f01'DllÙate criteria for self-givenness. At the same time he admitted the possibilit;r o'! illusory intuitions. Self-givenneas vas regarded by Scheler as the abaolute measure of cognition. That vhich. vas given vith an exact co-incidence 1 !Y!: Ethik, p. 393. 2 ~ Ethik, p. 394. 84 of intention and experience, i.e. adequately, vas in fact absolute beiDg.1 Essences vere either intuited, and thus self-g1ven, or not intuited and thus not given at aU (p. 69). The lack of an adequation of intention and self-givenness autolD8.tically renders the phenomenological experienC8 impure (p. 72) and lacld.ng in absolute evidenC9 (p. 89). An example of the function of self-givenness in respect to Scheler' s value theory is found in the case vhere, due to the self-givenness of a value, Socra'tes' maxim., that the action of the vill is determined by knovledge of the good, does indeed hold (p. 89). Scheler' s account of self-givenness and the sketchy suggestions he made for eliminatiDg illusions in respect to evidence are not satisfactory. Though Scheler is in soma sense correct in associating questions of criteria rlth knovledge which deals vith symbols rather than vith the given i tself, there must be soma more rigorous means of m.easuring the absolute degree of adequation than he bas provided. Because Scheler regarded self-givenness as a sound and unproblematic notion and spent li ttle time in suggesting measures to avoid illusions of evidenC9 the only critical response can. be that of providiDg, in some degree, such measures. It vould seem that illusion could be eliminated in lII&llY cases by subjecting it to intersubjective tests. Immediately, however, va are confronted vi th two problems though the object is a real objective enti ty and therefore available in theory to aU subjects, i t is possible 1 ~ Ethik. p. 398. 85 that the intuitive capacity of some subjects may be inadequate tO grasp tbis object and. tbat problems of communicating phenomenological experiences may prevent wo subjects who ~ in fact have the same intuition from ascerts' Di Dg that this is the case. But these are both problems which Scheler bimself raised and did not find insurmountable. The first problem tbat of :in.adequacy of intuition or, in the particular case where the objects are values, an undeveloped affective perceptive capaci ty is used by Scheler to explain the phenomena of diversity and. change of ethos. The problems of colllllIUllicating phenomenological intuitions serves to underline the non-symbolic and therefore non-discursi ve quali ty of phenomenological experience as opposed to other forma of experience. It theref'ore seems that some other approach than tbat of' intersubjectivity must in the end be taken to the problem of illusory intuitions. Indeed, in regard to the ultimate ethical questions vhere the indi vidual must stand alone, supported only by the moral autonomy which is bis due to bis intuition of' objective value, intersubjective tests can serve only a seconclary role. In such instances the ultimate responsibility rests vith the individual who can only do bis best to el j mi Date confusion of his interest.::S and prejudices vith what he affectively perceives to be valuable. In tbis context attention should perhaps be gi ven to the fact central to the Scheler1an schema vhereby the ultimate ref'erence for the individual in makfDg a value judgement is not duty or interest, ideally, whether for bimself or for society, but objective value as grasped ÈZ 1:!il! in affective perception. Such a viev bas been seen as giving moral sanction 86 to anarchic or f'ascist ~vements, particularly vhen i t is coupled 1fi th the views that a value may be given to only ~ person and that rea1ization of' a superior value is a morally good action. That reading of' Scheler would, however, be inadequate, f'or he did not neglect questions of' means and ends as this might be taken to imply. Nor did he allow subjective elements to influence Wertffthlen in the ideal case, though he admi tted that subjective elements, such as ressentiment, do in f'act of'ten influence value judgemeats. There are many valuable insights in Scheler's value theory. It is of great importance to find. a valid vay in which to ground the ultimate responsibility f'or value judgements in the individual, if the phenomenon of avoiding responsibility by aecing as if' an agent of the state, or a pawn of the necessity of a situation, is to be overcome. The need for a means of grounding value judgements is also to be seen in Anglo-American ethical discussion since Moore. Emotivism developed in reaction to the tendency in intuitionist circles to use Moore' s theory to give authority to their ovn attitudes and feelings. Ayer, Stevenson, and even Rare, hovever, in the end also make the indi vid.ual his own f'inal authori ty in value questions vi thout identifyi.ng 8IJY means vhereby value judgements are to be validly grounded in reatity. It is in his concern vith this most difficult and central problem that the importance of Scheler's discussions of value theory is found. Scheler's response to ethical relativity is brillant, and, taken together vith his an.al.ysis of the role of subjective elements in value judgements, strongl.y tempera what vould othervise be an unreal1stic absolutist value theory. The notion of essential .!. priori correlations of value theoretically protides the objective basis for a universally valid value system, vbile at the same time al.loving for the distinction betveen ethics and morali ty. Scheler vas at times careless in developing bis ideas and occasionally vent beyond the bounds of phenomenological evidence. An example of the latter is found, as va have aJ.ready noted, in his discussion of values as absolute and immutable. If' Scheler' s notions of Werttfllilen and objective value, or SOIlle close approrlmations thereof, could be shown to be correct, they vould be most valuable as a means of groundi ng value judgernents. They can, hovever, serve such a function only if illusory intuitions are eHmjnated and if values are not only objective, but also have a hierarchic relationship which can be grasped in affective perception. It is necessary to make an advance upon Scheler' s suggestions for the elimination of illusory intuitions and his account of self-givenness, but tbis ca:anot be done adequately vi thin the scope of this thesis. It is clear, however, that this is a task which must be performed if Scheler's value theory is in the end to be regarded, vi th any degree of certainty, as a scherne of practical and theoretical value, rather than rnerely a collection of untrustvortby, though occasionally brillant, insights. COllCUJSIOli It should be noted that the arguments of the fourth chapter vere circular in respect to the nature of value and the existence of ~ f'1!hlen. The notion of values ~s objective and irreducible to the physical attributes of their supports led d1rectly to the view that there must be soma 119&ns of grasping value other than that of sensation or re8.S()n. Likevise, just as objects or qualities of objects corresponding to sense experience must be assumed to enst if sensation is to be regarded as a faculty of grasping the objective vorld, so objects or qualities of objects vhich correspond to the experience grasped by feeliDg mu.st be assumed to exist if feeling is to be regarded as a cognitive facul ty. In a strong sense tbis observation is dameg:fng to the .hale argument for objective value and Vertffthlen. It in itself Call1lOt lead iJmaediately to rejection of the whale scheme, however, due to the lack of viable alternative positions, the fact that men continue to speak of values, and the ult1mate inevitability of such circles in 8'lJY epistemological problem mere one is concemed ri th the correspondance of the object and the means of knowing the objecte What l nov wish. to consider are the implications the position l have taken in opposition to Scheler's, in respect to the affective perception of value, whether independent or supported by phenomenal 88 89 objects, has for a value theory in which Wertnlhlen functiona as a cognitive faculty. IV position is that feeling does not grasp objective value 1mmediatel3' in the external vorld, but rather as supported by the object as i t i8 represented to the self' by sensation and perception, that is, as supported by the phenomenal objecte Our phenomenal experience 1s highly med1a.ted. The phenomenal object as gLven is structured by selection, attention, simplification, the frues of reference, etc., 1re bring to our experience. Thua, though representation 1s prior to judgement and feeling (tbis is the case directl3' for judgement, where 1 ts data is provided by the content of the representation, and ind1rectl3' for feeling where the object of feeling 1s not the representation of the thing or person supporting the value, or a representation of the value 1tself, but rather the value supported by the representation, which may be a more or less authentic representation of the external object), a representation may be influenced by reason and feeliDg. Thua, in ascertai n1 ng the validity of s:ny gLven value feeling, illusion must be avoided at two points. The first is in the conati tution of the phenomenal objecte The second 1s in the intuition of value as supported by that phenomenal objecte In both instances the questions raised about the adequacy of Scheler's notion of self'-gLvenness appl3'. It i8 possible for the conati tution of the phenomenal object to be authentic while the intuition of value as supported by that phenomenal object i8 illusory and~!!!!!: The goal, of course, is the elim1nation of illusion at both junctures. In addition errors of judgement are possible in respect both to the value grasped and to the phenomenal objecte e 90 The position l bave taken thus differs from that of Scheler in that i t recognizes an addi tional opportuni ty for illusion in value intuitions, insofar as these are regarded as intuitions which are to be valid for value as supported by external. objects. Consequently, rather than liaiting the range of influence vhich Scheler found subjective elements (perspectives, C"ucerns, interests, desUes, etc.,) to have in the relations of a human being to values and to tbj ngs and persons as supports of value, l have extended it. Subjective elemants are thus seen to be important m value the0l'l" not only insofar as they influence the affective perception of value, but also insofar as they influence our representation of any thing or person which supports value. A phenomenology of perception 18 therefore of importance for value theory. One could argue, of course, that value theory, as such, need be concerned only with the authenticity of value intuitions. Hovever, according to the posi tion l have taken, value theory cannot claim to be validly grounded in reali ty unless i t 18 accompan1ed by a sound perceptual theory. APPDDIX COMMImTS REGARDIliG HATERTAIS AVAILABIE Ili ENGLISH ON SCHElER 1 S ETHICS Max Scheler is relatively unknown in English spealdng countries, and fev of bis works have yet appeared in English translation. The folloving are the published English translations of Scheler' s wri tings: Ressentiment 1 ~ Nature 2! Sympathy ~ ~ EtemAl in ~ Han' s ~ la Nature Philosopbical Perspectives Ressentiment, first published in 1912, and later enlarged, is a short, non-tecbnical introduction to Scheler's early point of viev in bistorical sociology and social psycb.ology. The English translation by William Holdheim. is prefaced by a knovledgeable introduction by Levis Coser. The student of ethics will find this work particularly valuable as a detailed analysis of one of the lIIBllY factors which often lead to prejudiced value judgements. 1à!. Nature 2! Sympathl, first published in 1913, vas the firet of the English translations of Scheler's writings to be published. The translator, Peter Heath, included both a German-English glossary of technical terme and detailed footnotes commenting on problems of trans1Detailed information concerning publication of aU works mentioned in this Appendix is to be found in the Bibliograpby of this thesis. 91 92 lation, in part due to the highly technica1 nature of the work and therefore of much of i ts term1nology, and. in part due to the fact that bis translation could be expected to set precedents for :future translations of Scheler's writings. The introductory essay by W. Stark attempts to deal primarily vi th psychologica1 questions but also relates the vork to Scheler' s over-all philosophica1 po si tion. ~ Nature g! ~ path,y is a pb.enomenologica1 analysis of love, bate, sympathy, pity, etc., and contains a cri tique of metapbysica1 and naturalistic theories of the emotions. Feelings are regarded as our means of access to other minds. Knowledge of ourselves is gained only as va gradually differentiate ourselves from the totality of the objects of our immediate experience, Ybich, according to Scheler, includes other minds. Phenomenologica1 analysis is also the approach used by Scheler in his vork on religious philosophy, Q!! ~ Eternal ia ~. This YOrk bas been much discussed in Catholic circles. It represents a significant point in Scheler's pbilosophical develolJll9nt, for soon after its pu.blication in 1921 Scheler repudiated it and vas hereforth less involved vith pn-ely phenomenologica1 analysis of the questions he chose to study. Han' s Place ia Nature, firet published in 1928, appeared in English vith an excellent introduction by its translator, Hans Meyerhoff. It belongs to the same pbase of Scheler' s philosophica1 thought as Philosophica1 Perspectives, first pu.blished in 1929. These warka are fragments of the york pl.aJmed by Scheler to deal vith the question "ihat is man?" Scheler envisioned a philosophica1 anthropology vhich would render self-conscious man's self-knovledge as it bas developed in the 93 whole spectrum of lmman culture. This work vas never completed. These translations do not give an adequate view of Scheler's philosopby as a whole. The Gesammel te Wero. whan complete, will consist of thirteen volumes. The constrast in sheer bulle is quite evident, wbile that in content 1s less evident though just as real. It should be noted that none of the strictly ethical warka 1s ava1lable in English translation. Phenomenology, etbics, theology, and soc1ology are the sph.eres of thought and research on which Scheler's worka bave hacl s:rry s1gnificant influence in English speaking countries. Scheler' s value theory bas received attention for a variety of reasons. It bas appealed to soma people as a means of avoiding ethical relativisme It also exemplifies a realist po si tion which is of particular interest to those who vish to pursue a phenomenological ana.l.ysis and yet avo1d idealism. Dissatisfaction vith interest theories and viJUngness to consider affective perception as a cOgnitive faculty, subject to the same realist arguments as i6 sensation, seem to have been the other factors contributing to Scheler's popularity, l1mited as that bas been. Scheler bas not been neglected in England any more or less, generally speaking, than he bas in the United States. The main explanation for the lack of acquaintance vith bis wark in English speaking countries is the lack of representative translations end the ban on publication of bis vri.tings in Gel"Dl8DY from 1933-1945. The latter produced a lull in research and in discussion of bis theories both in Germany and abroad. 94 The reader who 1s interested in pursu1ng a study of Scheler' s ethics 1s weIl advised to begin vi th Herbert Spiegelberg' s ~ PhenomenoloBical Kovement. Sp1egelberg presents a well b8lanced viev of Scheler' s ethics as vell as of his philosopby as a wbole, thus provid1ng the student vi th a sense of the place of his ethics 1fi thin his system. It 1s primarily expos1 tory though certain central probleas are raised. "Max Scheler' s Ep1stemology and Ethics" by Alfred Schuetz and "The Phenomenological Ethics of Max Scheler" by Quentin Lauer are also valuable introductory stu.d1es. Quentin I.e.uer's Phenomenology: .il! Genesis .è Prospect provides a comparison of Scheler's point of viev on key points vith that of other phenomenologists, most notably Hu.sserl. AU of the works by Marvin Farber and V. J. McG1l1 listed in the 131bl1ograpby of this thes1s may also be read by vay of introduction to Scheler. They do not have, however, the Virtue of broad scope found in the warka mentioned above and in addition, on the bas1s of questionable arguments, accuse Scheler of having contributed to various UDpopular pol1tical and anti-soc1al tendenc1es. Jean Wahl's nA Letter to Ms.rv1n Farber" 1s an excellent response to the sort of arguments used by McG1ll and Farber, aven though Wahl vas not concerned vith Scheler as such at the t1me. John Staude's 1!!:!. Scheler 1874=1928: ~ Intellectual Portrait, 1s a vell documented historical study of Scheler, which 1s based not only on a studyof the German pol1t1cal, social, and intellectual forces of the period, but alao on a caref'ul reading of Scheler' s wr1 tings. William Frankena' s "Eth1cs", and Robert S. Hartman' s "General Theory of Value", 95 clarif'y the poei tion of Scheler' s ethics vi thin the spectrum of ethical thought. The following articles: 1) "Max Scheler's Epi~ :*emology of the Em0tions" by Hlmter Guthrie, 2) nA Phenomenological System ':)f Ethics" by Mary Evelyn Clark, 3) *Some Merits and Defects of Contempo:."S.l"Y Ge1'Jll8ll Ethics (xater1.ale lfertethik in Scheler, Spranger, B. Hartmann)* by David Baumgardt, and 4) nA Critique of Ethical Realismlt by Sidney Book, are aU journal articles !rom the 1930's. Those by Gutbrie and Clark are expository and deal vith Scheler's schematization of the emotions and his response to ethical relativity, respectively. Those by Baumgardt and Book are cri tical studies, the tiret being concerned vi th specific inconsistencies, some of which vere ~:~JDinated by B. Hartmann, and the second vi th the nature of the objects of phenomenological intuition. "Haterial Value in Max Scheler's Ethics, An Exposition and Critiquen , by Robert Daniel Sweeney is primarily a york: of superfic1al exposition, containing little criticism, and 1s therefore of lim1ted value. Sweeney finds D. von Hildebrand to have advanced be;rond Scheler' s ethical pori tion. "Max Scheler' s Theory of Moral Obligation", by Charles S. Wa.ll.ruff contains the most thorougb. presentation there is in English of Scheler' s cri tique of Kantian formalisme !!!. Scheler: A Concise Introduction ~ ~ World of â Great ThiDker, by Manfred Frings is best vhen m! read first due to the fact that i t is indeed.!!St concise. One section is devoted to Scheler's ethics. In this thesis l have attempted to deal systematical.l:r vith Scheler's notion of Wertnlhlen. To my knowledge this bas never been dODa before, .1 96 though the central importance of YertfBhlen to Scheler' s theory of non-formaI value bas long been recogn:l.zed. The problems vi th which l have dealt, the existence and nature of objective value and ~ ffthlen, error and illusion, and the debt of Scheler to Brentano and Husserl, are not l!!!t problems. Bach of them bas been discussed in soma context in the past; however, to mr knovledge they have never been systematical.ly deal t vi th in their relation to one another ei ther apart from, ~ in cozmection vith, Scheler's notion of Yertf"fthlen. l have attempted to protide a demonstration of their importance, in themselves, for one aItother, and for value theory. SEIECTED B:oeLIOGRAPHY Only those pri.mary and secondary warka whieh aN partieularly relevant to the problems discussed in this thesis have been included in this bibliography. Adorno, Theodore W. "Husserl and the Problem of Idealism," Journal .Q! PhilosophY. XXXVII (1940), 5-18. Allers, Rudolf. "The Cognitive Aspect of the Emotions," ~ Thomist, IV (1942), 589-649. ____ • "The SubJective and the Objective," Reviev of Metaphysics, XII (June, 1959), 503-519 • . p.tmann, Alex. 12!!. Grllndisgen ~ Wertethik: Wesen. Vert, Person. , !a. Sehelers Erkenntnis Jmà Seinslehre .Y! kritiseher Analyse. Berlin: Reuther &: Reicbard, 1931. Aster, Ernest von. "Zur Kritik der Materialen Vertethik," Kantstudien, XXXIII (1930), 173-199. Baumgardt, David. "Soma Merits and Defects of Contemporary German Ethics (Materiale Wertethik in Scheler, SPraD88r, N. Hartmann)," PhilosophY. XIII (1938), 183-195. Becker, Howard. "Soma Forma of Sympã: A Phenomenologieal Analysis," Journal .Q! Social ~ Abnormal Psyehology. XXVI (1931), 58-68. Becker, Howard, and Dahlke, Helmut otto. "Max Seheler's Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy.m!!! Phenomenologieal Researeh. II (19411942), 310-322. BlaDsbard, Brand. "The New Subjectivism in Etbics," Philosophy.m!!! Phenomenologieal Researeh, IX (1948-1949), 504-511. Brentano, Franz. lb!. Origin ~ ~ Knovledge of Right !m! Wrong. Translated by Cecil Hague. Iondon: .Archibald Constable, 1902. _~~-:' PsYChologie ~ empirischen Standpunkte. Vol I. Isipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1874. ____ • ~ ~ .!!!! ~ Evident. Edi ted and translated by Roderiek M. Cbisholm. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. 97' __ ~~. !2!! Ursprung si ttlicher Erkenntnis. Ieipzig: Duncloer und Humblot, 1889. 98 Catesson, J. "La valeur 'matériale' et ses conséquences," Critique. XIII (juin, 1957), 550-561. Chisholm, R. M. Realism 2 .!b!. Background .2!. Phenomenology. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. Clark, Mary Evelyn. nA Phenomenol0lP-ca1 System of Ethics," P.hilosophy, VII (1932), 414-430, and VIII (1933), 52-65. Demos, Rapbael. "Moral Values as Irreducible, Objective, and Cognizable," Philosophy e Phenomenological Research. VI (1945-1946), 163-193. Dupay, Maurice. La Philosophie de ~ Scheler. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1959. Eaton, Howard, ~ Austrian Philosophy.2! Values. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930. ___ ~. "The Content ofAxiologica1 Ethics," International Journal .2!Ethics. XLII (January, 1932), 132-147. ___ • "The Uni ty ofAxiological Ethics," International Journal .2! Ethics, XLIII (1933), 20-36. ___ ~. "'The Validi ty ofAxiological Ethics," International Journal of Ethics. XLIII (1933), 253-268. Emad, Parvis. "The Great Themes of Scheler," Philosophy Today, XII (Spring, 1968), 4-12. Eving, A. C. nIntuitionism and Utilitarianism," Revue Internationale ~ Philosophie, l (juillet, 1939), 649-665. Farber, Marvin. ~ Ai!!!.!.2! Phenomenology: ~ Motives. Methode. aM Impact .2! Husserl's Thought. Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper 8; Row, 1966. • "l!ax Scheler on the Place of Ifsn in the Cosmos, n Philosoph,y --and~ Phenomenologica1 Research. XIV (1953-1954), 393-400. __ ........ _. Nat1lralism and Subjectivism. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1959. _~,~. Phenomenology.e9:. Existence. Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper 8; Row, 1967. 99 Frankena, William K. "Ethics,* Values, Historx è Religion. Vol. nI of Philosophy .!a ~ ~-Centurx: !. Suney. Ed1 ted by Raymond Klibansk;y. 4 vols. Firenze: la Ifuova Italia, 1958, 42-77. Frings, Manfred. "Heidegger and Scheler," Philosophy Toda.y, XII (Spring, 1968), 21-30. • Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction into the World of a --Q-re-at Tii'iDker. Pittsburgh: Du.quesne University Press, 1965._--:~,. "lfon-Formal Ethics of Our Time," PhiI080phY 'roda.y, IX ( 1965), 85-93. Gabriel, Hago. "Das Problem der Ex1stenz objektiver Verte bei Mu Scheler, " Philo80pbische Hefte, l (1928-1929), 104-112. Geiger, Moritz. "An Introduction to Exi.stential Philosophy," Edited by Herbert Spiegelberg. Philosopb;t è Phenomenologi~ Research, In (1942-194'), 255-278. Gurvitch, Georges. ~ 'rendances Actuelles S!.1&. Philosophie Allemande. Beprint of the 1st edition. Paris: Librairie Vrin, 1949. Guthr1e, Hunter. "Max Scheler' s Epis'teaology of the Emotions,* ~ Modern Scboolman, XVI (19'9), 51-54. Haf'kesbr1!2k, Halma. "!he HeaniDg of Objecti viam and Real1am in Mu Scheler's Philo80phy of Religion: A Contribution .to the Understanding of Max Scheler's Catbolic Period," PhiI080p!ly!!!à Phenomenological Research, II (1941-1942), 292-309,. Hartman, Robert S. "The Epis'temology of the A Priori," Ph1lo80W !:!!! Ph.enomenoloScal Besearch, IX (1948-1949), 731-736. _~~.. "General Theory of Value," Values, Histor;,y!!!à Religion. Vol. In of Phil080ph.y:!!!'!!!' !;!!-centurx: A Survex. Ed1ted by Raymond Klibansky. 4 vols. Firenze: La kova Ital1a, 1958, 3-41. lIartmann, Ificola1. Ethics. Trsnslated by Stanton Coit. u,ndon: George Allen c!l: Umrin, 19'2. lIartmann, Wilfried. "Max Scheler and the English Speaking World,* Philo80phy Todgy, XII (Spring, 1968), '1-41. _~~. !!!. Scheler: Biblioe;rapbie. Stuttgart-:Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich :Froawm, 196'. _~....... "Max Scheler's !rheory of Persan,* Philo80Phl Toda.y, XII (Winter, 1968), 246-261. 100 Héring, Jean. "La phénoméno1ogie d'Edmund Husserl il y a trente sne,* Bevue Internationale ~ Philosophie, l (janvier, 19'9), '366-Yr3. Herman, Joach1a. J2!!!. Prinzipien !!.!: f'ormalen Geeetzeae~ Kants g ~ materialen Yertethik Schelem; Beitrag ~ Problem !!!t VerhUt- !lisses nischen PSlcho1ogie lm! Bthik. Breslau: E. Scheleany, 1928. Hildebrand, Dietrich von. Christian Ethics. New York: David McKay", 195'. Hook, Sidney, "A Cri tique of Ethical Realism," International Journal .2! Ethics, XL (1930), 179-210. Husserl, Edmand. Ideas: General Introduction!2. ~ Phenomenolou. Translated by Y. R. Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen a: Umr1n, 19'1. __ ~~. Ideen.!!!. einer RaiDen PhAnomenolo4e ~ PhBnomenolosischen Philosophie. Vol. 1. Edited by Walter Biemel. Vol. III of Husserliana. Edi ted by H. L. Van Breda. The Hagtte: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. _~~. lodsche Untersuchung!m.. Vol. l and Vol. n, Part 1. 2d ad. Halle, a. d. S.: Max Niemeyer, 191'. ____ • Icrische Untersuchunsen. Vol II, Part II. 2d ed. B.alle, a. d. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1921. Kattsoff, loius O. "The Discernment of' Xoral Attributes," Philosophy .è Phenoll8nolodcal Research, XXIX (1968-1969), 68-83. ____ ,. "Is Eidetic Intuition !iecessary," Philosopb.y.è Phenomeno10gical Research, X (1949-1950), 563-571. Kmlle, Eckb.ard. Joseph. Personality.! S'tub According ~ the PhilosoW ~ Value ~ Spiri t ~ !!! Scheler .è Nicolai Ba..-tmann. !renton, Hew Jersey: By the Author, 1941. Kraemer, William S. "Ethical Subjectivism and the Rational Good,* Philosophy ~ Phenomeno1ogical Research. XII (1951-1952), 5265,6. Kraft, Julius. !9A Husserl.!!!, Heidegger: Xritik ~ pbIDomenologischen Philosophie. Ieipzig: Buske, 19'2. Landgrebe, Imlvig. "Phenomenology and Metaphysics," Philosophy ~ Phenomenological Research, X (1949-1950), 197-205. LandmaDD, Michael. "Nicolai Hartmann and Phenomenology, If PhilosopbY ~ Phenomeno1ogical Research. III (1942-194'), '93-423. 101 Landsberg, Paul-Le "Husserl et l'idée de la philosophie, Il Revue Internationale ~ Philosophie, l (janvier, 19'9), '17-'25. ___ ..,;. ilL' Acte Philosophique de Max Scheler, Il Recherches Philosopbiques, VI (1936-1937), 299-'12. Lauer, Quentin. IIThe Ph.enomenological Kthics of Max Scheler, Il International Philosopb1 cal Qparterly, l (Xq, 1961), 273-291. ___ • Phenomenology:.!Ê!. Genesis !:!!!! Prospect. Harper !orchbooks. New York: Harper &: RoY, 1965. Iuther, Arthur. "Hocking and Scheler on Feeling," PhUosophy Today. XII (Summer, 1968), 93-99. Mandelbaum, Maurice. .:!'!!!. Phenomenology ~ Moral Experience. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955. McGill, V. J. "Review of .:!'!!!. Phenomenological Movement, by Herbert Spiegelberg. Il PhilosophY!!!! Phenomenological Research, XXII (1961-1962), 587-592. _~~. "Scheler's Theory of Sympatby and Love,* Philosophy and Phenomenologic&! Research. II (1941-1942), 273-291. Messer, August. Deutsche Wertphilosophie ~ Gegenvart. Isipzig: Reinicloe, 1926. Moore, Jared S. IIIs this PhenomenoJogy?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, III (1942-194'), 78-84. Moser, Shia. Absolutism S Relativism in Ethics. Springfield, IlliDois: Charles C. Thomas, 1968. Nota, John H. "Review of Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction into the Yorld .2! .!. Great 'lh.iDië'ër. by Manf'1oëd Frings ft PhilosoW 81\~ Phenomenological Research, XXVII (1966-1967t 119-120. Oakeley, Hilda D. ~ Philosophy ~ PersonaliV. London: Williams &: Norgate, 1928. Owens, Thomas J. "Scheler's Emotive Ethics," Philosophy !oday, XII (Spring, 1968), 13-20. Pfkunss, Justus. "Das Erkermtnisproblell bei Scheler 111 Hinblick auf' die nichtrationalen Faktoren der Erkermtnis.* Unpl.lblished dissertation, Munich, 1949. Reulet, Anibal S. "Reply to Marvin Farber,lI Philosophy lm! Phenomenological Research, X (1949-1950), 90-98. 102 Ross, Villiam David. Foundations 5!!. Ethics. lDndon: Oxford University Press, 1939. " Rozitcher, Leib Moises. "Ia Signification Ethique des Structures Aftectives dans la Philosophie de Max Scheler." Unpu.blished dissertation, University of Paris, 1960. Scheler, Max. ~ Formalismus .!A ~ Bthik ~ ~ materielle Wertethik: lfaner Versucb..m Grundlegung eines ethischen PersonaliSlll18. 4th ed. in Vol. Ilot GeSSDllll8lte VeNs. Edited by lIaria Scheler. Berne: Francloe, 1954. __ ~_. ~ formalisme !!1 éthique lll'ethigue matériale ~ valeurs, Essai nouveau ~ fonder ~ per80na.li8D18 lthigue. Translated by Kaurice de Gandillac. Paris: Ge.1l1mard, 1956. __ ~_. Man's Place .!A Nature. Translated by Hans Meyerhotf. Nell' York: N'oonday Press, 1963. ____ ., le!. Nature .2Î Sympathr. ~lated by Peter Heath vi th an introduction by W. Stark. Nell' Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. ___ " QÃ Etema! ~~. Translated by Bernard N'oble. Iondon: Student Christian Movement Press, 1960. ____ ,. PhiI080phical Perspectives. Translated by Oscar A. Haac. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. ___ ,' Ressentiment. Translated by William Y. Holdheim vi th an introduction by Levis Coser. lfew York: The Free Press, 1961, __ ~..:.' ~ Ethik ~ Erkenntnislebre. 2nd ed. in Schriften S!!. ~ N'achlass, Vol. l, in Vol. X of GeB8llllll8lte Verke. Edited by Maria Scheler. Berne: Francke, 1957. Scherer, Georg. "Der elllOtionale Apriorismus. Versuch einer Auseinandersetzung mit Max Scheler." Unpllblished dissertation. Bonn, 1951. Schilpp, Paul A. "The Doctrine of 'Illusion' and 'Error' in Scheler's PhenoJD8nology," Journal ot Philo80plq, XXIV (1927), 624-633. __ ...... _. "The 'l'omal Prob18ll8' ot Scheler' s Sociology ot Knoll'ledge, ft Philosopbical Review, XXXVI (1927), 101-120. ___ " "Jfax Scheler 1874-1928," Philo80pbical Raview, xn:vllI (1929), 574-588. Schuetz, Altred. "Choosing Among Projects ot Action,~ Philosopbl..!!à, Phenomenological Research, XII (1951-1952), 161-184. 10' _~=-. "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics, ft Review!!l Metaphysica, XI (1957-1958), 304-'14, 486-501. ___ ,. "Scheler' a Theory of Intersubjecti vi ty and the General Theaia of the Al ter Ego," Philosophy ~ Phenomenolosical Besearch, II (1941-1942), '23-347. Schuster, George N. "Introductory Statement to a SympoaiWll on the Signif'icance of Max Scheler for Philosopby and Social Science," Philosophr ~ Phenomenological Research, II (1941-1942), 269-Z72. Spiegelberg, Herbert. ~ Phenomenological Kovement: ! lIiatorical Introduction. 2 vols. 2nd ad. !he Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965. ___ • "Phenomenology of Direct Evidence, ft Phil080phy!:!!à Phenomenological Research, II (June, 1942), 427-456. _~~. "What Makes Good Things Good?" Ph:ilosophy s2:. Phenomenological Research, VII (1946-1947), 578-611. Staude, John. ~ Scheler 1874-1928: ~ Intellectual Portrait. New York: The Free Press, 1967. Stern, Alfred. "IB problème de l'absolutisme et du relativisme axiologique et la philosõe allemande," Bevue Internationale ~ Philosophie, l (juillet, 19'9), 703-742. Str&sser, Stephan. "Phenomenologica1 Trends in European Psychology," Philosop}ty !:M Phenomenologica1 Research. XVIII (1957-1958), 18-:34. Sveeney, Robert Daniel. "Katerial Value in Max Scheler' s Ethics, An Exposition and Cri tique. ft Unpu.blished dissertation. Fordham Uni verai ty , 1962. Urban, Yilbar. "Axiology, " in Tventieth Century Philosophy. Edi ted by D. RImes. Bev York: Philosophy Library, 1947, 53-7'. _____ ~. "The Present Situation in Axiology, Il Revue Internationale ~ Philosophie, l (juillet, 19'9), 609-621. Van De Pitte, Margaret HagdaleDe. "The EpisteJDological Function of an Affective Principle in the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity." Unpublished dissertation. The University of Southern Calif'ornia, 1966. Vivas, Eliseo. ~~ Mf.!. è ~ Ethic31 Li fe. Chicago: !he University of Chicago Press, 1950. Vahl, Jean. "A lBtter to Marvin Farber, ft Philosophy.!!!à Phenomenolosical Reaearch, XI (1950-1951), 401-405. _. 104 \fallruff, Charles S. "Max Scheler' s Theory of Moral Obl~gation. Il Unpublished dissertation. University of Ca.l.U'ornia, Berkeley, 19'9. ____ • Ph1losophica1 Theory ~ Psyehologica1 l!g!. Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1961. Welch, E. Parle 1'!!!. Ph1losophy of Edmnnd Ho.sserl: 1'!!!. Origin ~ Develo_nt ~ Ë!!. Phenomenology. New York: Columbia Univers! ty Press, 1941. Werbieister, W. H. "Problems of Value Theory," PhilosophY and Phenomenologica1 Research, XII (1951-1952), 495-512. Wild, John. "On the Nature and Aima of Phenomenology," Ph1losophy .!!!! Phenomenologica1 Research, III (1942-194'), 85-95. Williams, Richard Hays. "Scheler' s Contribution to the Sociology of Affective Action, vith Special Attention to the Problem of Shame," PhilosophY è Phenomenologica1 Research, II (1941-1942), ~'58. Wintbrop, Henry. "The Constitution of Error in the Phenomenologica1 Reduction, " PhilosophY'!!!! Phenomenologica1 Resesrch, IX (1948-1949), 741-748.